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Norma Fuentes-Mayorga, Ph.D.*
“By listening to those who have paid the greater price for their commitment to a just world, we can move forward with them, closer to the
2
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Introduction
On November 20, 2017, then-acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine Duke announced that beginning in summer 2019, Haitians
would no longer receive Temporary Protected Status (TPS), a short-term
legal designation guaranteeing their right to remain and work in the
United States. 3 This announcement followed an investigation by the De-

3. Press Release, Elaine Duke, Acting Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for Haiti (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/11/20/acting-secretary-elaine-duke-announcementtemporary-protected-status-haiti# [https://perma.cc/R9YM-8HJ9] (announcing decision
not to extend TPS).
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partment of Homeland Security (DHS) into continuing TPS for Haitians
that, unlike investigations in prior years, asked for crime statistics and
welfare information on Haitians with TPS. The announcement followed
a series of racist remarks from President Donald Trump, which included
commenting that Haitians “all have AIDS” 4 and asking “[w]hy are we
having all these people from shithole countries come here?” in response
to reports of immigration from El Salvador, Haiti, and African nations.5
At the time of publication, advocates have filed four lawsuits in
United States (U.S.) federal courts that challenge the cancellation of TPS
for Haitians. 6 In Ramos v. Nielsen7 and Saget v. Trump, 8 the Northern District of California and the Eastern District of New York, respectively, issued preliminary injunctions, essentially staying the cancellation of TPS
until a final decision is made on the case.9
While the injunction in Ramos was reversed and vacated by the
Ninth Circuit at the time of this paper’s publication, the injunction in
Saget remains, the decision to cancel TPS is still on the books, and the
future status of TPS continues to change pending ongoing litigation and
administrative action. 10 The justifications for canceling TPS for Haitians
4. See Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Stoking Fears, Trump Defied Bureaucracy to Advance Immigration Agenda, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/23/us/politics/trump-immigration.html (discussing
racist remarks reportedly made during meeting with president).
5. See Josh Dawsey, Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from ‘Shithole’ Countries,
WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-attacksprotections-for-immigrants-from-shithole-countries-in-oval-office-meeting/2018/01/11
/bfc0725c-f711-11e7-91af-31ac729add94_story.html?utm_term=.aa8f0120c055&wpisrc
=al_news__alert-politics—al (discussing comments made during a meeting on immigration); see also Ali Vitali, Kasie Hunt & Frank Thorp V, Trump Referred to Haiti and African
Nations as ‘Shithole’ Countries, NBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com
/politics/white-house/trump-referred-haiti-african-countries-shithole-nations-n836946
[https://perma.cc/E7PU-XFPL].
6. See Challenges to TPS and DED Terminations and Other TPS-Related Litigation,
CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC. (Sept. 21, 2020), https://cliniclegal.org
/resources/humanitarian-relief/temporary-protected-status-and-deferred-enforceddeparture/challenges [https://perma.cc/MX72-D4EE] (noting additional challenges to
TPS terminations for other countries).
7. Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Ramos v. Wilson,
ACLU OF SOUTHERN CAL., https://www.aclusocal.org/en/cases/ramos-v-nielsen
[https://perma.cc/XR9H-GGDW] (last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
8. Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
9. See Ramos, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075; see also CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC.,
supra note 6.
10. See Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020); Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp.
3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2019; What’s Next for TPS Holders? ACLU OF SOUTHERN CAL.,
https://www.aclusocal.org/en/know-your-rights/whats-next-tps-holders
[https://perma.cc/WS5Y-4DW7] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020). See U.S. CITIZENSHIP &

4

Michigan Journal of Race & Law

[VOL.26:1

reflect long-standing, exclusionary racism within U.S. immigration law,
and specifically, long-standing discrimination against Black immigrants.11
Those racist justifications further highlight the need to develop new humanitarian approaches to immigration law that don’t simply provide relief
from harm, but actually repair the harms done.
This Article places the Trump Administration’s decision to cancel
TPS for Haitians within the longer history of U.S. racism and exclusion
against Haiti and Haitians, observes the legal challenges against this decision and their limitations, and imagines a future that repairs the harms
caused by past and current racist policies. First, this Article briefly outlines
the history of exclusionary, race-based immigration laws in the United
States, and specifically how this legal framework, coupled with existing
anti-Black ideologies in the United States, directly impacted Haitians and
Haitian immigrants arriving in the United States. Next, the Article provides an overview of the TPS decision-making process, the Trump Administration’s openly racist comments against Haitians and other people
of color before and during the decision-making process to cancel TPS,
and the departure from the established administrative process for TPS
cancellation. The Article then reviews the legal challenges against TPS
cancellation and the arguments that the decision violated the Equal Protection Clause and how such efforts reveal the limitations of litigation as a
tool to achieve social justice.
Looking towards the future, this Article discusses reparations and
remittances as creative ways to repair some of the damage wrought by the
United States’ history of racial discrimination in immigration and foreign
policy against Haitians. Specifically, this Article explores three solutions:
(1) recognizing the harms caused specifically to Haitians by the United
States’ exclusionary foreign affairs and immigration policies; (2) using material and non-material forms of reparations, including extending TPS,
offering a pathway for citizenship for TPS holders, or offering Haitian
TPS recipients benefits to public programs; and (3) valuing the role remittances play in affirming Haitians’ autonomy and working towards
eroding decades of imperialistic treatment of Haitians.

IMMIGR. SERVS., Temporary Protected Status (last reviewed Sept. 8, 2020),
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status
[https://perma.cc
/3FR9-NU8W] (noting that, due to injunctions in several court cases “USCIS will extend, through Oct. 4, 2021, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and the validity of certain
TPS-related documentation.”); see also Continuation of Documentation for Beneficiaries
of Temporary Protected Status Designations for El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Sudan,
Honduras, and Nepal, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,208 (Dec. 9, 2020).
11. For more on this, see Institutional Racism, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com
/definition/institutional_racism [https://perma.cc/3U6Y-TWFN].
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This paper recognizes that there is no instant remedy for the centuries of harm the United States inflicted upon Haitians. As Yale Professor
Harlon Dalton so aptly analogizes:
Dealing with our racial wound is very much like [dealing with
a physical wound]. Healing is a process that has many steps.
Yet we try to move too quickly from the traumatic event to
the day the bandages are removed. In our zeal to avoid inflaming the wound, we fail to clean it properly. We rush to
close it, and do not check to see if our stitches have held. We
ignore the possibility of infection, and convince ourselves that
the occasional oozing is nothing to worry about. We cover it
with material that is contaminated, and leave the dressing unchanged for fear of what we may discover underneath. And so
our racial wound festers. 12
This Article aims to uncover the festering wound caused by decades of
racism towards Haitians through national and international politics and
offers ideas for healing.
I. The Wounds Caused by a History of Discrimination Against
Non-White Immigrants – A Background
A. The Infection: Race-Based Discrimination in U.S. Immigration Policies
From its inception, the U.S. government has rhetorically promised
to welcome immigrants of all origins, and yet has categorically failed to
deliver on that promise. 13 Writing to his friend in the Netherlands,
George Washington wrote, “I had always hoped that this land might become a safe and agreeable asylum to the virtuous and persecuted part of
mankind, to whatever nation they might belong . . . .”14 Historically,
however, this promise of welcome has only been a guaranteed for white
Europeans. 15 In reality, the rhetoric of a nation of religious freedom for

12. HARLON DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN
BLACKS & WHITES 99 (1996).
13. See Kaila C. Randolf, Executive Order 13769 and America’s Longstanding Practice of
Institutionalized Racial Discrimination Towards Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 47 STETSON L.
REV. 1d, 8 (2017) (discussing racial discrimination in immigration).
14. Letter from George Washington to Francis Adrian Van der Kemp (May 28, 1788),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-06-02-0266 [https://perma.cc
/A3DR-VE7G].
15. See, e.g., Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (allowing any immigrant
who was a “free white person,” had lived in the United States for two years and could
demonstrate good moral character to apply in court for U.S. citizenship).
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immigrants of all nations contrasted starkly with the enslavement and
forced immigration of African peoples, the genocide and forced relocation of indigenous peoples, and the racist ideologies held by many U.S.Americans. 16 The 1857 Dred Scott v. Sandford 17 decision went so far as to
declare that African Americans were not and could never be U.S. citizens. 18 The forced kidnapping of enslaved individuals created a U.S. immigration system that, as immigration scholar Professor Rhonda Magee
observes, “was inculcated with the notion of a permanent, quasi-citizenworker underclass and privileged white ethnics under naturalization
19
law—its legacies we can see up to the present day.”
Countless examples throughout U.S. history highlight both blatant
and thinly veiled efforts to exclude non-European immigrants. 20 For instance, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 explicitly barred Chinese laborers from immigrating to the United States, a precursor to years of the
United States barring individuals from entering the country based on national origin. 21 Congress used discriminatory measures such as literacy
tests, 22 quota systems, 23 and the likelihood to “be a public charge” to fur16. See Randolf, supra note 13, at 7 (discussing racial discrimination in immigration);
see also Benjamin Franklin, Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of
Countries, etc. (1751) (“Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a Colony of Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our Language or Customs, any more than they can acquire our Complexion?”); see generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE HUDDLED MASSES
MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2003) (observing the United States’ history of
race-based oppression and exclusion). Assimilationist scholars have argued that becoming
a North American has inevitably implicated the internalization of racist ideologies, where
whiteness is valued and blackness inferiorized, even if at a subconscious level; see
RICHARD D. ALBA, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM: ASSIMILATION AND
CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION (2009); MILTON MYRON GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN
AMERICAN LIFE: THE ROLE OF RACE, RELIGION, AND NATIONAL ORIGINS (1964); Ramon Grosfoguel & Eric Mielants, The Long-Durée Entanglement Between Islamophobia and
Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System, 5 HUMAN
ARCHITECTURE: J. SOCIO. SELF-KNOWLEDGE, Fall 2006, at 1.
17. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
18. Id. at 406.
19. Rhonda V. Magee, Slavery As Immigration?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 273, 276-77 (2010)
(emphasis added) (arguing that “transatlantic slavery was . . . a system of state-sponsored
forced migration human trafficking”). For a discussion of African exclusion in immigration matters, see generally Bill Ong Hing, Symposium: Immigration Policies: Messages of Exclusion to African Americans, 37 HOW. L.J. 237 (1994) (discussing lack of migration from Africa to the United States).
20. See Hing supra note 19, at 237. For a further discussion of exclusionary immigration policy, see infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
21. See generally Randolf, supra note 13 (discussing exclusion of certain immigrants
based on national origin or race).
22. See The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act), Pub. L. No. 68-139
(replaced by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965).
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ther exclude underprivileged individuals of color—or those seen to be
from undesired racial and ethnic groups—from entering the United
States. 24
Quota systems specifically excluded individuals of African descent
from immigrating to the United States by restricting the quantity of admitted immigrants from a particular nationality to a percentage of the
number of immigrants of the same nationality already in the United
States. 25 Because United States census data did not include African Americans, nearly all immigration from Africa was barred while the quota systems were in place from 1917 to 1965. 26
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 prohibited discrimination based on race and nationality, thus ending the quota system.27
However, recent policy decisions—while ostensibly race-neutral—go
against the spirit of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. For example, the regular categorization of Central American and Caribbean
refugees as “economic migrants,” rather than asylum seekers fleeing persecution, has led to the exclusion and deportation of thousands of individuals seeking protections under international law. 28 The “diversity visa”

23. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A
“Magic Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1112, 1127 (1998) (describing quota
system whereby proportion of individuals allowed into the United States was based on
percentages defined by 1890 census); see also Randolf, supra note 13, at 17 (noting that
quota systems continued from 1917 to 1965).
24. See Randolf, supra note 13, at 18-19 (discussing how the U.S. government denied
visas to Jews fleeing Nazis because they were “likely to [be] a public charge” and even
sent back ships full of refugees who later died in Holocaust).
25. See Malissia Lennox, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the U.S.’ Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687, 714 (1993) (“In 1924, the allowable immigration rate was reduced to 2 percent and African-Americans were explicitly excluded
from the census.”).
26. Id.
27. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 §§ 201, 202, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151,
1152(a)(1)(A) (“no person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated
against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality,
place of birth, or place of residence.”).
28. See generally Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article
/central-americans-and-asylum-policy-reagan-era [https://perma.cc/7KJH-TL9E] (discussing treatment of Central American migrants and asylum-seekers); Cecilia Menjívar,
Central American Immigrant Workers: How Legal Status Shapes the Labor Market Experience, in
27 RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK 3-28 (Jody Agius Vallejo ed., 2017); Cecilia
Menjívar, Andrea Gómez Cervantes & Daniel Alvord, The Expansion of “Crimmigration,”
Mass Detention, and Deportation, 12 SOCIO. COMPASS, e12573 (2018).
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program, which proposes bringing more immigrants from countries with
“low” numbers of applicants, tends to favor European immigrants.29
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, a new pattern of racialization has been most apparent in the increased rates of apprehension and
deportation targeting foreign-born Black, Latino, and Muslim groups.30
The passing of two federal laws—the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Death
Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)—tied immigration policies to criminal laws.31
These laws increased social control over individuals who had certain
types of criminal convictions and ensured that these immigrants be deported with little recourse through due process and judicial review, as has
been the case, for example, of most Dominicans in New York City, the
majority of whom are legal permanent residents. 32 The USA Patriot Act
of 2001 intensified the provisions of these two 1996 laws, enhancing
their effectiveness by establishing the link between local law enforcement
on crime and national law enforcement on immigration. 33

29. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in
the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525, 532
(2000) (noting impacts of immigration laws and their intersection with race).
30. Christopher Rivera, The Brown Threat: Post-9/11 Conflations of Latina/os and Middle
Eastern Muslims in the US American Imagination, 12 LATINO STUD. 44, 59 (2014). Please
note, in this paper the authors use the term “Latino” instead of the gender-neutral
“Latinx” to reflect the fact that deportation has mainly targeted the foreign-born, who
largely identify as “Latino” or “Hispanic.” See Luis Noe-Bustamante, Lauren Mora &
Mark Hugo Lopez, About One-In-Four U.S. Hispanics Have Heard of Latinx, but Just 3%
Use It, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 11, 2020) https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2020
/08/11/about-one-in-four-u-s-hispanics-have-heard-of-latinx-but-just-3-use-it/
[https://perma.cc/ELQ8-C3CL] (reflecting that only three percent of U.S. Hispanics
identify as “Latinx” and only twenty-nine percent were aware of this label). Since a larger
majority of deportees are male, the authors consider the term Latino most appropriate in
this context. See also, Maria R. Scharrón-del Río & Alan A. Aja, Latinx: Inclusive Language
as Liberation Praxis, 8 J. LATINX PSYCH. 7 (2020).
31. Melina Juárez, Bárbara Gómez-Aguiñaga & Sonia P. Bettez, Twenty Years After
IIRIRA: The Rise of Immigrant Detention and Its Effects on Latinx Communities Across the Nation, 6 J. ON MIGRATION AND HUM. SECURITY 74 (2018); Rivera, supra note 30, at 4464; see also DAN KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 10-13 (2007).
32. See DAVID C. BROTHERTON & LUIS BARRIOS, BANISHED TO THE HOMELAND:
DOMINICAN DEPORTEES AND THEIR STORIES OF EXILE 23, 81 (2011) (describing how
immigration and criminalization laws have targeted non-citizen, Brown and Black Latino
men for deportation since 9/11); Menjívar et al., supra note 28.
33. Monisha Das Gupta, “Don’t Deport Our Daddies”: Gendering State Deportation Practices and Immigrant Organizing, 28 GENDER & SOC’Y 83, 89 (2014).
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These acts linking federal laws and local ordinances have resulted in
the increased criminalization and deportation of non-white groups. 34 This
virulent backlash continues to be racialized, as it increasingly targets
mostly Black and Brown Latino and Muslim immigrants. Recent research
suggests this pattern is mainly gendered, as men continue to rank top
among the criminalized, perceived as threats to the U.S. national security
and economy. 35 This is most recently evidenced by President Trump’s
sustained depiction of Mexicans and Central American refugees as illegal
immigrants or as invaders, arriving in “caravans.” 36 This criminalized portrayal reproduces systemic racialization and dehumanizes—but also ignores—the life-threatening circumstances that fuel these groups to seek
refuge in the United States in the first place. 37 Further, the modern-day
“control through deterrence” policies on the Mexican-U.S. border have
resulted in the deaths of thousands of refugees yet sparked hardly any
public outcry in the United States. 38 The rhetoric that the United States

34. Doris Marie Provine & Roxanne Lynn Doty, The Criminalization of Immigrants as a
Racial Project, 27 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 261, 272 (2001); see also Rivera, supra note
30, at 60.
35. See Tanya Golash-Boza & Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Latino Immigrant Men and
the Deportation Crisis: A Gendered Racial Removal Program, 11 LATINO STUD. 271, 274
(2013). For a comprehensive history of how immigration policies aimed at deportation
and population control have always targeted non-white, working class, foreign-born
groups, mostly from Latin America, Asia, and Africa, see Provine & Doty, supra note 34.
For more historical antecedents on the societal racialization of Hispanic people in the
United States, see Rubén G. Rumbaut, Pigments of Our Imagination: On the Racialization
and Racial Identities of ‘Hispanics’ and ‘Latinos’, in HOW THE U.S. RACIALIZES LATINOS:
WHITE HEGEMONY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 15-36 (José A. Cobas, Jorge Duany & Joe
R. Feagin eds., 2009) (Observing: “Latin Americans were exempted from these legal exclusions. Largely at the urging of American growers and ranchers, no limits were set on
Western Hemisphere countries: it was understood that cheap, unskilled Mexican labor
could be recruited when needed, as happened during World War I and the 1920s, and
again during the Bracero Program; and that those laborers could be deported en masse
when they were no longer needed, as happened during the 1930s and again during “Operation Wetback” in the mid 1950s.”).
36. See Eduard Fabregat, Sara Vinyals-Mirabent & Marian Meyers, “They Are Our
Brothers”: The Migrant Caravan in the Diasporic Press, 31 HOW. J. COMMUNICATIONS 204
(2020). See generally PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT
CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985) (describing civic myths of
legal immigration).
37. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, WOMEN ON THE RUN (2015),
https://www.unhcr.org/5630f24c6.pdf [https://perma.cc/HUN9-Y4MY]. See also
PATRICIA HYNES, MICHELE LAMB, DAMIEN SHORT & MATTHEW WAITES, NEW
DIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2016); Tanya Golash-Boza & Cecilia Menjívar, Causes and Consequences of International Migration: Sociological Evidence for the
Right to Mobility, 16 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1213, 1214 (2012).
38. See BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA: THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 2 (Jo
Carillo, Darrell Y. Hamamoto, Rodolfo D. Torres & E. Frances White eds., 2004).
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welcomes immigrants of all origins has proved to be myth that was only
true for some, a case that is exemplified in the experience of Haiti and
Haitians.
B. A Wound Left to Fester: From Twin Colonial Revolutions to Imperial
Subjugation: The Problematic History of Haiti and the United States
While discriminating against other non-white immigrants, including
Haitians, the United States has also intervened and undermined Haitians
in Haiti for much of its history. The United States failed to recognize
Haiti’s sovereign status for nearly seventy years after its independence and
regularly refused to recognize Haitian asylum seekers as political refugees.
From the colonial era to the present-day policies that deprive the Haitian
people of their agency, the United States has treated Haiti unjustly, causing lasting, residual harm to its citizens.39
In 1791, enslaved men and women of African descent launched the
largest insurrection of enslaved persons in world history, freeing everyone
on the former French colony of Saint-Domingue within two years and
establishing their independence as the first Black republic in the Western
Hemisphere. 40 For nearly seven decades, the United States refused to recognize Haiti’s sovereignty, in large part due to fears that such a recognition of an independent Black republic would threaten the United States’
own system of racial slavery and caste. 41 The United States stood by silently as Haiti was forced to sign an agreement to compensate France for
taking its “property”—the very human beings who made up the fabric of
the newly-formed country—and the United States benefited from loaning to Haiti at exorbitant interest rates.42 Adjusted for inflation, it took
39. The scope of this paper does not seek to chronicle the entire history of HaitianU.S. relations but rather mentions several pertinent historical events to provide context
for reparations. For further information on the history of Haitian-U.S. relations, see infra
Part II.C.
40. See LAURENT DUBOIS, HAITI: THE AFTERSHOCKS OF HISTORY, 22-51 (2012).
41. See id. The United States did not recognize Haiti as a nation until 1862, 58 years
after Haiti declared itself an independent nation. See also OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, THE
U.S. AND THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION, 1791–1804, https://history.state.gov/milestones
/1784-1800/haitian-rev [https://perma.cc/DD9Q-VEHC] (acknowledging lack of U.S.
support for Haitian revolutionaries); Horace Campbell, Haiti: Reparations and Reconstruction, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (May 19, 2011) https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/haitireparations-and-reconstruction [https://perma.cc/XG5X-M4W3] (outlining Haiti’s history and arguing for reparations).
42. Dan Sperling, In 1825, Haiti Gained Independence from France for $21 Billion -- It’s
Time for France to Pay It Back, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017, 6:10 PM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/realspin/2017/12/06/in-1825-haiti-gained-independence-from-france-for-21billion-its-time-for-france-to-pay-it-back/#2571f5fe312b [https://perma.cc/CW82HLRS] (“Haiti dutifully paid France reparations over the course of nearly six generations
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Haiti 122 years to pay off its twenty-one billion dollar “debt” and the interest on that “debt.” 43 This destabilized the country economically for
decades because it was spending approximately 80 percent of its budget at
times on repayments to lenders such as the United States. 44 From 1915 to
1934, the United States invaded and occupied Haiti under the guise of
maintaining its financial interests. 45 Then-Secretary of State Robert Lansing justified the intervention with racist undertones, arguing that Haitians were incapable of self-government and had “an inherent tendency
toward savagery and a physical inability to live a civilized life.” 46 Senator
Medill McCormick echoed the sentiment, touting the occupation as necessary to “develop the country, the Government, and above all, the civilization of the people, of whom the overwhelming majority have African
blood in their veins.” 47
The U.S. occupation further destabilized the country and robbed
Haitians of their agency as U.S. Marines helped businesses take land from
Haitian rural landowners, dismantle labor unions, and violently suppress
uprisings. 48 Even though the occupation ended in 1934, the United States
continued to exert control over much of Haiti’s external finances until

– with interest.”). “In 1825, barely two decades after winning its independence against all
odds, Haiti was forced to begin paying enormous ‘reparations’ to the French slaveholders
it had overthrown.” Id. See also DUBOIS, supra note 40 (discussing Haiti’s history); see also
Vanessa Buschschluter, The Long History of Troubled Ties Between Haiti and the US,
BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8460185.stm
[https://perma.cc/94MM-7XLP] (discussing Haiti’s history).
43. Bill Quigley, Why the US Owes Haiti Billions — The Briefest History, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 19, 2010, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-quigley/whythe-us-owes-haiti-bil_b_426260.html [https://perma.cc/2CY8-GMPH] (discussing U.S.
history in Haiti and case for reparations); see also Sidney W. Mintz, Whitewashing Haiti’s
History, BOS. REV. (Jan. 22, 2010), https://bostonreview.net/archives/BR35.1/mintz.php
[https://perma.cc/55YH-XYCV] (noting that “[a] country wracked by more than a decade of invasion and revolution, then faced with financial punishment and isolation for
scores of years, could not build the internal framework a strong civil society requires”).
44. See Sperling, supra note 42. See also John Henley, Haiti, A Long Descent into Hell,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2010, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/14
/haiti-history-earthquake-disaster [https://perma.cc/ZZR8-Y3MF] (discussing history of
Haiti).
45. See David Kroeker Maus, 100 Years of American Occupation in Haiti, ANTILLEAN
MEDIA GROUP (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.antillean.org/american-occupation-in-haiti100/ [https://perma.cc/B8PJ-J9T6] (describing U.S. intervention in Haiti).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Westenley Alcenat, The Case for Haitian Reparations, JACOBIN (Jan. 14, 2017),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/01/haiti-reparations-france-slavery-colonialism-debt
/ [https://perma.cc/3E7Z-LAKA] (discussing case for reparations for Haiti and describing
the history of U.S. occupation of Haiti).
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1947. 49 Haitian security forces trained by the United States, the Gendarmerie, and military leaders from the American Military School in Haiti
continued to assert power in Haiti through the 1950s, and U.S.-backed
dictators pillaged the country through the 1980s, committing numerous
human rights violations, including the torture, arbitrary arrests, and disappearing of individuals to undisclosed prisons, all as part of the U.S.-led
War on Drugs. 50
The colonial, white supremacist, and paternalistic attitude with
which the United States treated Haiti in its finances and governance has
also been reflected in its treatment of Haitian refugees. From the 1970s
on, thousands of Haitians fleeing to the United States as political refugees
were denied asylum because they were viewed as economic migrants and
many others were returned to Haiti without an accurate determination of
their asylum claim through the “Interdiction Program.” 51 At the same
time, Haitians in the United States faced racial discrimination, including a
ban on blood donations from Haitians due to unfounded concerns about
AIDS. 52 In November 1991, the Coast Guard began sending Haitian
asylees to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where they were held in deplorable
conditions and eventually repatriated without credible fear interviews for

49. Edwidge Danticat, The Long Legacy of Occupation in Haiti, NEW YORKER (July 28,
2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/haiti-us-occupation-hundredyear-anniversary [https://perma.cc/3J8W-M4SB] (describing U.S. occupation of Haiti).
50. Id. See also Quigley, supra note 43 (discussing brief history of Haiti).
51. See Lennox, supra note 25 (noting that of 50,000 Haitians who attempted to gain
asylum between 1972 and 1980, a mere 25 were granted asylum). See Clare P. Gutekunskt, Interdiction of Haitian Migrants on the High Seas: A Legal and Policy Analysis,
10 YALE J. INT’L L. 151, 154 (1984) (discussing policies returning migrants fleeing Haiti
during the 1980s). See also High Seas Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, Proclamation No.
4865, 3 C.F.R. 50 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 app. at 1259 (1988) (allowing for
Haitians to be returned to their home country if intercepted at sea). See also Rachael L.
Godlove, United States Asylum Policy: Safe Haven or Structured Exclusion? 1, 72
(Nov. 21, 2008) (M.A. thesis, Georgetown University), https://repository.library.
georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/558205/umigeorgetown-1068.pdf?sequence=1
[https://perma.cc/3QKN-PS2N] (discussing unfair treatment of Haitian asylum-seekers);
History Lesson 9: Refugees from the Caribbean – Cuban and Haiti “Boat People”, CONST.
RIGHTS
FOUND.,
http://www.crfimmigrationed.org/lessons-for-teachers/148-hl9
[https://perma.cc/854L-QVS2] (last visited Nov. 9, 2020) (detailing history of Haitian
refugees).
52. Bruce Lambert, Now, No Haitians Can Donate Blood, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
1990, at A20, https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/14/us/now-no-haitians-can-donateblood.html#:~:text=The%20latest%20change%2C%20officially%20adopted,regardless%20
of%20when%20they%20immigrated. (“The Haitian-American leaders also say the move
will revive the stigma and bias that afflicted Haitians when the Federal Centers for Disease
Control initially listed them as a high-risk group.”).
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asylum, as required under international law. 53 Those with HIV/AIDS
were detained in what some have deemed the world’s first HIV/AIDS
internment camp and denied protections normally afforded to refugees
54
seeking U.S. assistance, despite legal challenges. Professor Harold
Hongju Koh, a lawyer for the interned Haitians, observed:
[T]he archetypal ‘good’ alien favored by American immigration law is a white, European, healthy, heterosexual, selfsufficient refugee, arriving alone in search of political asylum . . . it hardly surprises that black, poor Caribbean migrants
arriving in large numbers, many afflicted with HIV (a disease
associated with homosexuals) should fare poorly in our
courts. 55
The United States’ treatment of Haitians refugees from the 1970s
through the 1990s stands in stark contrast with its treatment of Cuban
political refugees under the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA), which required the United States to return Cubans intercepted at sea to Cuba
while providing those Cubans who made it to the United States with
protection, access to welfare programs and services, and a path to citizenship. 56 While many Cubans are categorized as “white,” Haitians are of
53. See Harold Hongju Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm” in United States Human Rights Policy,
103 YALE L.J. 2391, 2394 (1994) (discussing repatriation of Haitians without credible fear
interviews). See also Ron Harris, Immigration: Fleeing Haitians Failing to Find a U.S. Advocacy: Few Voices Among Groups Who Once Escaped Oppression Are Raised in Refugees’ Behalf,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-12-03-mn591-story.html [https://perma.cc/A7LR-73FH] (discussing legal challenges to programs
interning Haitians). See also Harold Hongju Koh, America’s Offshore Refugee Camps, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 139, 141-42 (1995) (discussing detention of Haitian asylum seekers at
Guantanamo Bay). Koh notes that “of the 22,000 Haitians interdicted at sea during the
next decade, only eleven were screened in and brought to the U.S. to pursue asylum
claims.” Id. at 142. See generally Janice D. Villiers, Closed Borders, Closed Ports: The Plight of
Haitians Seeking Political Asylum in the U.S., 60 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 848-49
(1994) (describing challenges faces by Haitians seeking asylum in the U.S. in the 1990s).
54. See Koh, America’s Offshore Refugee Camps, supra note 53, at 142 (“The INA offers
these statutory protections only to aliens who reside in or have arrived at the border of
the U.S.”). See also Edwidge Danticat, Trump Reopens an Old Wound for Haitians, NEW
YORKER (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trumpreopens-an-old-wound-for-haitians [https://perma.cc/3CAL-F476] (discussing misinformation regarding Haitians with HIV/AIDS and discrimination within the United
States); Lizzy Ratner, The Legacy of Guantánamo, NATION (July 14, 2003),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/legacy-guantanamo/ (discussing internment
of individuals with HIV/AIDs at Guantanamo Bay).
55. Harold Hongju Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm” in United States Human Rights Policy,
103 YALE L.J. 2391, 2422 (1994).
56. See Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732. See Julia Preston, Tension
Simmers as Cubans Breeze Across the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016),
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African descent and mostly “Black.” 57 Arguably, the United States had a
political interest in supporting those fleeing “communism” in Cuba, but
no other nationality had—or has—the immigration benefits that Cubans
were granted upon entry, including other countries with communist regimes. 58
The United States maintained a strong military presence in Haiti
with multiple military interventions in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as involvement in several changes in dictators.59 The United States supported
foreign-owned sweatshops in Haiti and dumped U.S.-subsidized produce—including rice and sugar—into Haiti, greatly harming the local

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/us/as-cubans-and-central-americans-enter-usthe-welcomes-vary.html?_r=0 (noting difference in treatment between Cubans and other
immigrants). The wet foot/dry foot policy ended in 2016. See also Adrian Florido, End Of
‘Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot’ Means Cubans Can Join Ranks Of ‘Undocumented’, NPR (Jan. 15,
2017, 7:07 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/01/15/509895837
/end-of-wet-foot-dry-foot-means-cubans-can-join-ranks-of-the-undocumented
[https://perma.cc/JLK2-JARZ] (observing “most of the Cubans who fled Castro’s regime
soon after the 1959 revolution were political exiles . . . of the largely white middle class
whose property and businesses Castro seized and nationalized. . . . [T]his set Cubans apart
from many other Latinos in the U.S., who aside from tending to be economic migrants
also lacked the legal status that would have allowed them to achieve their full potential.”).
See generally RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., CUBAN MIGRATION TO THE
U.S.: POLICY AND TRENDS 1, 2 (2009), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40566.pdf
[https://perma.cc/73NN-ZA9R] (discussing Cuban migration over the 20th century).
57. See Randolf, supra note 13, at 26 (discussing differing policies towards Haiti and
Cuba). See also Human Rights in Haiti: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs of the House
Comm. of Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 70 (1975) (noting “U.S. Government’s position toward Haitian refugees contrast [sic] sharply with the warm welcome extended Cuban refugees (who are mostly white)”). See generally Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F.
Supp. 442, 497 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff’d sub nom. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d
1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (comparing treatment of Haitians and Cubans).
58. See WASEM, supra note 56, at 2 (“The [Cuban Adjustment Act], as amended, provides that certain Cubans who have been physically present in the U.S. for at least one
year may adjust to permanent resident status at the discretion of the Attorney General—
an opportunity that no other group or nationality has.”).
59. Jonathan M. Katz, This Is How Ignorant You Have to Be to Call Haiti a ‘Shithole,’
WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything
/wp/2018/01/12/this-is-how-ignorant-you-have-to-be-to-call-haiti-a-shithole/?utm
_term=.ed1f0521e61f (discussing history of Haiti). For a discussion of United States intervention into Haitian democracy, see Jake Johnson, Revealed: USAID Funded Group Supporting Haitian President in 2011, AL JAZEERA AM. (July 15, 2015, 5:00 AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/15/usaid-funded-group-supporting-haitianpresident.html [https://perma.cc/2YNJ-GT3P] (describing U.S. role in 2010 elections in
Haiti); see also Press Release, Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y & Rsch., OAS Insider Reveals Details of
Illegal Foreign Intervention Against Haitian Democracy (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.cepr.net
/press-release/oas-insider-reveals-details-of-illegal-foreign-intervention-against-haitiandemocracy/ [https://perma.cc/B39H-NBWK] (discussing U.S. interference in Haitian
elections).
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economy, putting local farmers out of business, furthering deforestation,
and forcing people to migrate to over-crowded cities to look for work.60
United States aid to Haiti following the 2010 earthquake supported large
NGOs, many of which used outside contractors for rebuilding parts of
Haiti, thus taking work away from the local economy, giving Haitians
less ownership in recovery efforts, and taking agency away from the Haitian government.61 This approach to aid created dependence on international NGOs and continues to cripple the Haitian economy and government. 62 Thus, what started as a refusal to recognize the sovereignty of the
first nation of freed enslaved people continues in a paternalistic refusal to
recognize the ability of the Haitian government to handle international
aid, a refusal to believe that conditions in Haiti have not materially improved since the 2010 earthquake, and a refusal to continue any form of
protected status for Haitians, motivated by a president’s personal animus
for Haiti. As Fredrick Douglass once observed: “Haiti is black, and we
have not yet forgiven Haiti for being black.”63
II. The TPS Band-Aid and a Wound Quickly Going Septic: A NotSo-Temporary Status With Some Protections for Haitians
The United States government granted and then cancelled Temporary Protective Status (TPS) for Haitians, in keeping with the nation’s
long history of de jure and de facto xenophobic and racist treatment of
Haitians. TPS falls into a long line of immigration policies that create a
second-class status for immigrants and, disproportionately, immigrants of
color. This Part provides an overview of TPS, the grant of TPS for Haitians, its subsequent cancellation, and the impact on Haitians, the communities they live in, and the Haitian diaspora in the United States. The

60. Amy Wilentz, The Distant Memories of Haiti Before the Quake, TIME (Jan. 23, 2010),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1953379_1953494
_1956237,00.html [https://perma.cc/H2E7-5VSG] (discussing impact of subsidized goods
on Haitian marketplace). See generally Henley, supra note 44 (discussing deforestation in
Haiti).
61. See Richard Knox, 5 Years After Haiti’s Earthquake, Where Did The $13.5 Billion
Go?, NPR (Jan. 12, 2015, 11:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2015
/01/12/376138864/5-years-after-haiti-s-earthquake-why-aren-t-things-better
[https://perma.cc/23NP-GRUJ] (noting how “[w]ith few exceptions, donor nations and
nongovernmental organizations insist on keeping control of their projects, which are set
according to their own priorities.”).
62. CLARE LOCKHART & JOHANNA MENDELSON FORMAN, ESCAPING THE CRISIS
TRAP: NEW OPTIONS FOR HAITI (2014) 22-24.
63. Frederick Douglass, Lecture on Haiti at the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair (Jan. 2,
1893), http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti/history/1844-1915
/douglass.htm [https://perma.cc/H5FK-T9PF] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
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historical background and disparate impact are key elements in the racebased discrimination challenges the Article will address in Part III.
A. Covering the Injury: Temporary Protected Status (TPS),
A Short Fix
Congress created TPS in 1990 as a short-term humanitarian measure to temporarily safeguard foreign nationals present in the United
States. 64 However, the process for TPS designation has been highly political and has offered little stability for those whose TPS designation has
been frequently renewed. 65 TPS applies in three situations: (1) where
there is an “ongoing armed conflict within the state” that “would pose a
serious threat” to the personal safety of citizens of that state; 66 (2) when a
natural event causes a “substantial, but temporary, disruption of living
conditions” that would make it difficult for the state to receive repatriated citizens; 67 and (3) when there are “extraordinary and temporary conditions” that would make it dangerous for individuals to return to their
country of origin and their temporary stay in the United States would not
compromise “the national interest of the U.S.” 68 To grant TPS to residents of a country, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS Secretary”) traditionally confers with government agencies, including the Department of State, to determine the conditions in the
country under consideration. 69 Notably, TPS takes the “national interest
of the U.S.” into account in only one category, creating a strong statuto-

64. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 280 (2000) (discussing TPS as “a short-term strategy to secure the immediate physical safety of refugees and a way station to more durable protection.”). See Donald Kerwin, Creating a More Responsive and Seamless Refugee Protection
System: The Scope, Promise and Limitations of US Temporary Protection Programs, 2 J. ON
MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 44 (2014), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177
/233150241400200104 [https://perma.cc/DD29-357L]. See, e.g., 135 Cong. Rec.
H7501-3, at H7507 (statement of Rep. Brennan) (expressing humanitarian need for
TPS). See also 136 Cong. Rec. H8629-02 (1990) (expressing humanitarian need to respond to individuals already present in the United States).
65. See sources cited supra note 64.
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A).
67. Id. § 1254a(b)(1)(B).
68. Id. § 1254a(b)(3)(C).
69. Id. § 1254a(b)(1). Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in
2002, TPS designation and extension was given by the Attorney General. See generally Jill
H. Wilson, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues, CONG. RSCH.
SERV. (Apr. 1, 2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS20844/53
[https://perma.cc/9JQ7-DA45] (describing TPS).
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ry interpretation argument that internal politics and domestic concerns
should not be considered under the other categories for granting TPS.70
The DHS Secretary can issue or extend TPS for periods of six to
eighteen months, and TPS recipients in the United States have received
temporary status in the country for up to twenty-nine years based on ongoing crises. 71 TPS has been granted to a variety of groups, including
Hondurans and Nicaraguans after Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and Kosovo
residents during and after the genocide. 72 Currently, immigrants from El
Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua and Sudan account for 98
percent of TPS recipients.73
While TPS recipients are granted legal status and authorization to
work, TPS does not encourage or drive migration to the United States
from designated countries—the program only protects individuals already
present in the United States when natural or political disasters occur.74
Unlike asylum, which is granted based on individual persecution, TPS is
given when country conditions as a whole make it unsafe to return. 75 Also unlike asylum, which provides an eventual path for permanent residence in the United States, TPS offers no direct path to a stable immigration status. 76 With the continual consideration of country conditions and

70. Sarah Anchors, Temporary Protected Status: Making the Designation Process More Credible, Fair, and Transparent, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 565, 579 n. 81 (2007) (“the fact that the statute
only instructs the AG to consider the ‘national interest of the U.S.’ in reference to granting TPS under this final category indicates that the AG is not to consider U.S. national
interests under the other categories.” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (b)(1)(C) (2000))).
71. See Bill Frelick, What’s Wrong with Temporary Protected Status and How to Fix It,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 1, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/01
/whats-wrong-temporary-protected-status-and-how-fix-it [https://perma.cc/SJK8XHLR] (stating timeline within which TPS must be renewed; citing U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 10) “TPS has been in effect for 10 years for Haitians, 19 for
Salvadorans, 21 for Hondurans and Nicaraguans, 23 for Sudanese, and 29 for Somalis.”
72. Anchors, supra note 70, at 573 (discussing situations in Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Kosovo that led to their TPS designation).
73. D’vera Cohn, Jeffrey S. Passel & Kristen Bialik, Many Immigrants with Temporary
Protected Status Face Uncertain Future in U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 27, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/27/immigrants-temporary-protectedstatus-in-us/ [https://perma.cc/Z43A-XN83].
74. Anchors, supra note 70, at 579 (“TPS is unlikely to make the U.S. a ‘magnet,’
meaning it is unlikely that the program encourages people to try to enter the United
States. TPS only affects those who are already in the U.S.”)
75. Id. at 580 (discussing TPS determinations).
76. Temporary Protected Status: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Feb. 2, 2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/temporary-protected-statusoverview [https://perma.cc/9SL6-AGM5] (“TPS does not provide beneficiaries with a
separate path to lawful permanent residence (a green card) or citizenship. However, a
TPS recipient who otherwise is eligible for permanent residence may apply for that status.”); See Frelick, supra note 71 (proposing changes to U.S. refugee law to protect indi-
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eighteen-month extensions, TPS holders are afforded no certainty of
their immigration status and left in “legal limbo.”77
B. The Infection Beneath the Dressage: TPS Grant and
Cancellation for Haitians
On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti, killing over 220,000 people. 78 Three days later, then-Secretary of Homeland
Security, Janet Napolitano, announced the decision to grant TPS to Haitian nationals in the United States. 79 Nine days later, the designation was
published in the Federal Register, citing the impact the earthquake had
on critical infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, schools, and transporta80
tion systems for food, fresh water, and medical supplies. Due to political

viduals who currently do not receive protection). See also id. (discussing the U.S.’s international obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the ways in which other
countries have incorporated the ideas of temporary protection into their asylum systems).
“Many countries around the world conduct a two-pronged assessment when considering
a claim for protection. They include all European Union (EU) member states, Albania,
Australia, Bosnia, Canada, Finland, Macedonia, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand,
Norway, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine. First,
these systems examine claims using the international refugee definition from the 1951
Refugee Convention: a well-founded fear of being persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. But asylum seekers who do not meet this definition can also be recognized as needing a complementary status as a protected person if they can establish that, if returned, they would
face a real risk of serious harm for reasons other than a fear of being persecuted.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
77. Tianhao He & Daren Zhang, Opinion, Uncertainty over TPS, BOS. GLOBE (Nov.
18, 2019, 12:15 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2019/11/18/opinion/uncertaintyover-tps/ [https://perma.cc/7B62-M2WZ]; See also Claire Bergeron, Temporary Protected
Status After 25 Years: Addressing the Challenge of Long-Term “Temporary” Residents and
Strengthening a Centerpiece of US Humanitarian Protection, 2 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC.
22, 29 (2014).
78. Haiti Earthquake - Our Response, OXFAM INT’L, https://www.oxfam.org/en/haitiearthquake-our-response [https://perma.cc/8FDA-MAMX] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020)
(describing 2010 earthquake).
79. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement from Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano on Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian Nationals (Jan.
15, 2010), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2010/01/15/secretary-napolitano-temporaryprotected-status-tps-haitian-nationals [https://perma.cc/SE6B-APGE] (noting provision
of a “temporary refuge” for Haitians “whose personal safety would be endangered by returning to Haiti”).
80. Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 75 Fed. Reg. 3,476 (Jan. 21,
2010). See also Jordan E. Dollar & Allison D. Kent, In Times of Famine, Sweet Potatoes Have
No Skin: A Historical Overview and Discussion of Post-Earthquake U.S. Immigration Policy Towards the Haitian People, 6 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 87, 113 (2011) (discussing impact of 2010 earthquake on Haiti and U.S. immigration policy).
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instability, internal displacement, a cholera outbreak, subsequent natural
disasters, and continued poverty, the United States extended Haiti’s TPS
classification for subsequent eighteen-month periods from 2010 to
81
2017.
Under the Trump administration, the process for extending TPS
differed significantly. While TPS extensions are typically based on conditions within the TPS-designated country, the Trump Administration instead began seeking crime and welfare data on Haitian TPS recipients,
despite the fact that TPS holders are ineligible for welfare. 82 In addition
to seeking data on criminal records and welfare use of TPS recipients,
USCIS Chief of Policy and Strategy Kathy Kovarik also sought data on
how many Haitian TPS recipients were “illegal pre-TPS designation.”83
She instructed staff to provide information “[g]iven that the Sec is going
to need it to make a decision.”84 Following these inquiries, thenSecretary of Homeland Security John Kelly extended TPS for Haitians
for six months on May 22, 2017, citing the country’s multiple camps for
internally displaced persons, gender-based violence, and the fact that
81. See Extension and Redesignation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 76 Fed.
Reg. 29,000, 29,001 (May 19, 2011) (describing conditions leading to extension of TPS);
Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 77 Fed. Reg.
59,943, 59,944 (Oct. 1, 2012); Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 79 Fed. Reg. 11,808, 11,809 (Mar. 3, 2014); Extension of the Designation
of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 80 Fed. Reg. 51,582, 51,583 (Aug. 25, 2015);
see also Complaint at 7-5, NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568
(D. Md. filed Jan. 24, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00239).
82. See Alicia A. Caldwell, AP Exclusive: US Digs for Evidence of Haiti Immigrant Crimes,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 9, 2017), https://apnews.com/740ed5b40ce84bb398c82c48884
be616 [https://perma.cc/Y8YT-AS8Z] (reporting that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services [USCIS] head of policy and strategy responded to information that data could
not be found on crime rates of TPS recipients by stating, “We should also find any reports of criminal activity by any individual with TPS. Even though it’s only a snapshot
and not representative of the entire situation, we need more than ‘Haiti is really poor’
stories.”). Notably, TPS recipients are not eligible to receive welfare.
83. First Amended Complaint at ¶ 79, Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 287
(E.D.N.Y. filed May 31, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01599) (citing Ex. 4 at 44, 48); Caldwell, supra note 82.
84. First Amended Complaint at ¶ 79, Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 287
(E.D.N.Y. filed May 31, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01599). Soon after, various Senators wrote to
then-DHS Secretary John F. Kelly regarding the information on criminal history and
public benefits data on Haitian TPS holders. See Letter from Senator Robert Menendez,
et al., to John F. Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (May 19, 2017),
https://www.menendez.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HAITI-TPS_5_19_17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZGD6-VCCX]. The Senators expressed that they were “concerned
that you will use this information in your decision. Such analysis would be outside the
statutory framework for deciding whether to extend TPS, and it would be a disturbing
executive overreach . . . [T]he timing of this information request suggests that this information is pretext to deny an extension of TPS.” Id.
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those who had left displacement camps had “moved back to unsafe
homes or relocated to informal settlements located in hazardous areas.”85
In his decision, Secretary Kelly also noted the impact of Hurricane Matthew on Haiti in 2016, flooding and landslides in April 2017, and increasing food insecurity in Haiti.86 While he found the conditions in Haiti supported an extension of TPS, he also noted that Haitian TPS holders
should prepare to return to Haiti.87
In June 2017, Secretary Kelly testified to the Senate and ascribed
past TPS extensions to “automatic renewals.” 88 He repeatedly stressed he
wanted to focus on the word “temporary” in the program’s name and
indicated he would only look at “the earthquake” in Haiti, despite the
fact that previous Secretaries considered “extraordinary” conditions to
determine whether the TPS extension was warranted. 89 Despite bipartisan
support from prominent politicians, calls from the Haitian government to
extend TPS for Haiti, and evidence from international NGOs, on November 20, 2017, DHS issued a press release stating its intention to cancel
TPS for Haitians: “[b]ased on all available information . . . those extraordinary but temporary conditions caused by the 2010 earthquake no longer exist.” 90 According to the press release, the termination would have a
85. See Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed.
Reg. 23,830, 23,832 (May 24, 2017).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov. Aff., 115th Cong. (2017) [hereinafter Budget Request Hearing] (statement of John F. Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.).
89. See Saget First Amended Complaint, supra note 83, at 27 “DHS officials were
communicating the same message in internal correspondence. For example, in preparation
for a meeting between newly-elected Haitian President Jovenel Moïse and the Vice President Mike Pence at a Chamber of Commerce conference in Miami, Director of Latin
American and Caribbean Affairs at DHS, David Cloe, circulated talking points including:
‘TPS is meant to be a temporary measure, not a permanent parole policy.’” (citing Budget
Request Hearing, supra note 88).
90. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Acting Secretary Elaine Duke Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for Haiti (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov
/news/2017/11/20/acting-secretary-elaine-duke-announcement-temporary-protectedstatus-haiti# [https://perma.cc/624H-27WR] (announcing decision not to extend TPS).
For examples of bipartisan support of continuing TPS, see, e.g. Letter from Sen. Benjamin
L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Comm. on Foreign Relations, to Elaine C. Duke, Acting
Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo
/media/doc/11-8-17%20BLC%20letter%20to%20DHS%20on%20Haiti%20TPS%20
extension.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA22-RJ6D] (requesting TPS extension); Letter from
Rep. Jimmy Gomez, et al., to John Kelly, White House Chief of Staff, & Elaine C.
Duke, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://gomez.house.gov
/uploadedfiles/11-01-2017_congressman_jimmy_gomez_letter_to_white_house_cos
_kelly_and_dhs_acting_secretary_duke_re_temporary_protected_status.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R9ZV-SS63] (noting humanitarian impact of TPS cancellation).
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delayed effective date of eighteen months, but the conclusions stated in
the press release were not recorded in the Federal Register until two
months later. 91 The reasons cited for TPS cancellation included the decrease in internally displaced persons, increasing GDP growth, and lower
levels of cholera. 92
Haitian TPS holders and advocates for Haitians recognized that
both the decision to cancel the program and the rationale provided by
DHS were inconsistent with the prior approaches to TPS and the material conditions of Haiti. 93 Haiti’s Ambassador to the United States, Paul G.
Altidor, noted that Hurricane Matthew, flooding, a cholera breakout, and
further damage from Hurricanes Irma and Maria impeded Haiti’s efforts
to recover and its inability to receive returning citizens. 94 Steve Forester,
the Immigration Policy Coordinator for the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, noted, “Haiti is a textbook case for TPS.”95 He ob91. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 90; Termination of the Designation of
Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed. Reg. 2,648 (Jan. 18, 2018).
92. Prelim. Inj. Order at 57, Saget v. Trump, 351 F.Supp. 3d 251 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr.
11, 2019) No. 18-CV-1599 https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs
/practitioners/our_lit/impact_litigation/2019_12Apr_tps-haiti-prelim-injunt.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/EQ4W-MBX7] (further explaining and outlining the irregular process
by which TPS for Haitians was cancelled); see Ivan Watson & Joe Vaccarello, U.N. Sued
for ‘Bringing Cholera to Haiti,’ Causing Outbreak That Killed Thousands, CNN (Oct.
10, 2013), https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/09/world/americas/haiti-un-cholera-lawsuit
/index.html [https://perma.cc/4DKC-TEP5] (describing cholera crisis).
93. See Letter from Paul G. Altidor, Haitian Ambassador to the United States, to
Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Oct. 4, 2017),
http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article178072401.ece/binary/Lettertothe
%20HonorableElaineC.Duke.pdf (requesting TPS extension for Haitians and noting how,
in response to signaling from U.S. officials that TPS would soon end and as a result of
extensive environmental damage caused by the landslides and Hurricane Matthew, the
Haitian government requested an 18-month extension for TPS on October 4, 2017). See
also Letter from the Cong. Black Caucus to Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. (Nov. 3, 2017), http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10
/CBC-Haiti-TPS-Update-Letter.pdf (discussing impact of repatriation of TPS recipients
and loss of remittances) [https://perma.cc/MN3X-Z99M]; Letter from Rep. Alcee L.
Hastings et al., to Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 18,
2017), https://alceehastings.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=398877
(urging renewal of TPS).
94. Letter from Paul G. Altidor, Haitian Ambassador to the U.S., to Elaine C. Duke,
Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Oct. 4, 2017), http://www.miamiherald.com
/latest-news/article178072401.ece/binary/Lettertothe%20HonorableElaineC.Duke.pdf
(requesting TPS extension for Haitians).
95. Press Release, Inst. for Just. and Democracy in Haiti, DHS Distorts Law and Precedent to Ignore Glaring Facts on Haiti TPS (Nov. 2017), http://www.ijdh.org/2017/11
/topics/immigration-topics/for-immediate-release-dhs-distorts-law-and-precedent-toignore-glaring-facts-on-haiti-tps [https://perma.cc/2YSH-M74V] (noting “[DHS] cynically moved the goalposts, ignoring the realities on the ground to justify a result determined by an anti-immigrant agenda, not facts.”).
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served, “Haiti has recently endured precisely the extraordinary blows
contemplated by the TPS statute, specifically an unchecked cholera epidemic and October 2016’s Hurricane Matthew, which DHS itself cited
in its analysis as recently as May [2017].” 96 Despite evidence that conditions in Haiti had not improved since the 2010 earthquake, DHS ended
TPS for Haitians, meaning that Haitians in the United States who currently hold TPS will no longer be able to legally remain in the country
upon its expiration.97
C. The Wound Spreads: The Detrimental Effects of the Trump Administration
Rescinding TPS for Haitians
Many Haitian immigrants and their U.S.-born descendants predict
that TPS cancellation will be devastating for both Haitians who have TPS
and the communities they live and participate in. 98 In 2017, the majority
of Haitians with TPS had been in the United States for seven to fifteen
years and their earnings contribute both to Haiti’s recovery and the United States’ tax base. 99 Many Haitians have already been impacted by the
decision: the failure of DHS to publish its November 2017 decision in
the Federal Register until January 18, 2018 resulted in many Haitians losing their employment due to uncertainties regarding their legal permission to work. 100
Centro Presente v. Trump, which challenges the cancellation of TPS
for Haitians and Salvadorans, highlights not only the economic but also
the emotional and material harm that will be inflicted from the decision.
If TPS rescission goes into effect, Plaintiffs, and other TPS
beneficiaries will suffer immediate and irreparable injuries to
their rights under the U.S. Constitution and federal law; to
their proprietary interests; and to their dignity. Without TPS,
96. Id.
97. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Acting Secretary Elaine Duke Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for Haiti (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/11/20/acting-secretary-elaine-duke-announcementtemporary-protected-status-haiti# [https://perma.cc/A28B-X37U] (announcing decision
not to extend TPS).
98. For a discussion of the impact of TPS cancellation on both Haiti and the United
States, see infra Part III.
99. The Politics of Immigration, Action Kit for Haitian TPS - May 19, BLOGGER (May
19, 2017) http://thepoliticsofimmigration.blogspot.com/2017/05/action-kit-for-haitiantps-may-19_19.html [https://perma.cc/35KM-5XKY] (providing information about
TPS for Haitians).
100. See Complaint at 23, NAACP v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568
(D. Md. filed Jan. 24, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00239) (explaining importance of having timely
information for expansion of TPS).
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most beneficiaries will not have access to employment authorization which gives these immigrants (and their employers) an
assurance that they may put their talents to use . . . Without
employment, many TPS beneficiaries will also lose health
benefits. Plaintiffs and other TPS beneficiaries will have to
prepare for imminent removal. Plaintiffs will incur costs to ensure that their property rights, family relationships, and tax obligations are protected. [TPS] rescission stigmatizes immigrants
of color, as well as their children and families, and imposes a
dignitary harm by denying them the dignity and respect they
deserve under the U.S. Constitution and federal law. By labeling TPS beneficiaries from El Salvador and Haiti as undesirable . . . the federal government ratifies and legitimizes the notion that immigrants of color . . . are worthy of lesser social
stature. 101
Prior to TPS cancellation, advocates warned against the negative
impact of cancelling TPS, noting that conditions in Haiti are not stable
enough to receive deportees safely and warning of the harm that the influx of TPS recipients could have on the country. 102 Given that Haiti is
still struggling to rebuild its infrastructure since the earthquake, including
housing, hospitals, schools, and other critical services, accepting an additional 58,000 individuals into the country would create enormous strain
on a vulnerable country already facing significant difficulty providing for
its own citizens. 103 Haitian activist Marleine Bastien observed, “Haiti is
not ready to absorb 58,000 [individuals] . . . . It’s going to be a disaster
for the 58,000 families in the United States and a disaster for Haiti.”104 In
a bipartisan letter to DHS, members of Florida’s congressional delegation
expressed a similar concern: “persistent, difficult conditions in Haiti war-

101. Complaint at 31-32, Centro Presente v. Trump, 332 F. Supp. 3d 393 (D. Mass.
filed Feb. 22, 2018) (No. 18-cv-10340).
102. BAJI Denounces DHS’ Inhumane Decision to Terminate Program for Haitian Earthquake
Survivors, PRISON INDUSTRY DIVESTMENT MOVEMENT (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://prisondivest.com/2017/11/20/baji-denounces-dhs-inhumane-decision-toterminate-program-for-haitian-earthquake-survivors/
[https://perma.cc/55NF-NRJP]
(“Large influxes of nationals will disrupt and negatively impact the nation’s path towards
recovery”).
103. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
104. Jaqueline Charles & Patricia Mazzei, Haitian Quake Victims in the U.S.
Will Lose Deportation Protection in 2019, MIA. HERALD (Nov. 21, 2017),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article
185716193.html (discussing impact of cancellation of TPS on Haitians).
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rant a full extension . . . We owe it to the Haitian people to assist them
in their efforts, especially as they begin to make limited progress.”105
In addition, many Haitian TPS holders in the United States no
longer feel that they have ties to Haiti. As Paula Vilme, a young Haitian
mother who has lived in the United States since age nine, observed, “I
do not believe I will survive one month in Haiti . . . I’ve been here [in
the United States] for so long. My whole life is here . . . [.] This is home,
so when they tell you to go back, where am I going to?”106 Paula is not
the only Haitian TPS holder raising a family in the United States. More
than 270,000 U.S. citizen children have parents who are TPS recipients
from either Haiti, El Salvador, or Honduras, meaning a parent could potentially be forced to leave their children behind in the United States or a
child would be forced to go to a country they do not know. 107 Ramos focuses further on the impact on children:
Defendants’ new rule violates the constitutional rights of
school-age U.S. citizen children of TPS holders, by presenting
them with an impossible choice: they must either leave their
country or live without their parents. It is well established that
a U.S. citizen has an absolute right to reside in this country. It
is equally well established that families have a fundamental
right to live together without unwarranted government interference. 108
Moreover, cancellation of TPS will impact the U.S. and Haitian
economies. 109 The Center for American Progress estimated that an aver105. Letter from Sen. Bill Nelson et al., to Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2017/11/21
/trump_administration_ending_temporary_protective_status_for_58000_hatian
_refugees.html [https://perma.cc/V26J-ZSTB].
.
106 See Charles & Mazzei, supra note 104.
107. Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, A Statistical and Demographic Profile of the US
Temporary Protected Status Populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti, 5 J.
MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 577, 581 (2017); see also Letter from Sen. Patty Murray et al.,
to Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Reverse Administration Decision to Expose Thousands to Dangerous Deportations (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://votesmart.org/public-statement/1205364/letter-to-the-hon-elaine-c-dukeacting-secretary-of-homeland-security-reverse-administration-decision-to-exposethousands-to-dangerous-deportations#.Wl5A1ainGUk [https://perma.cc/4N24-RX98]
(discussing impact of TPS termination on children of United States citizens).
108. Class Action Complaint at 2, Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083 (N.D. Cal.
filed Mar. 12, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01554).
109. See generally, AMANDA BARAN & JOSE MAGAÑA-SALGADO, IMMIGRANT LEGAL
RES. CTR., ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS BY SALVADORAN, HONDURAN, AND HAITIAN
TPS HOLDERS: THE COST TO TAXPAYERS, GDP, AND BUSINESSES OF ENDING TPS
(Apr. 2017), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017-04-18_economic
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age of $10,070 is spent in deporting just one person. 110 Bloomberg reported that canceling TPS would cost the United States $280 million in contributions to its GDP. 111 The Immigrant Legal Resource Center estimated
that ending TPS for Haiti and Honduras would reduce Social Security
and Medicaid by $6.9 billion over a decade and decrease the U.S. GDP
by $45.2 billion over the same period.112
Canceling TPS would cause Haiti to suffer the additional loss of the
investment revenue that Haitians living in the United States contribute to
their ancestral homeland.113 For example, in 2006, remittances composed
20 percent of Haiti’s gross domestic product (GDP) and by 2019 remittances made up nearly 40 percent of GDP. 114 Additionally, in Haiti, due
to the fact that the financially weakened state cannot absorb all the costs
of caring for its citizens, remittances make up for the state’s deficiencies,
allowing many families to invest in their health or basic necessities, mainly the education of their children.115
Additionally, TPS holders play key roles in their communities—
working, paying taxes, volunteering, participating in civic life, and building equity. 116 According to a 2017 study, 6,200 households with Haitian

_contributions_by_salvadoran_honduran_and_haitian_tps_holders.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8Y7L-UGPF] (discussing economic impact of TPS cancellation).
110. Philip E. Wolgin, What Would It Cost to Deport All 5 Million Beneficiaries of Executive
Action on Immigration? CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 23, 2015, 8:53 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/%202015/02/23/106983
/what-would-it-cost-to-deport-all5-million-beneficiaries-of-executive-action-onimmigration/ [https://perma.cc/X5ZT-637A].
111. LAURA D. FRANCIS, BLOOMBERG BNA, ENDING HAITIANS’ PROTECTED STATUS
COULD COST U.S. $280M (May 16, 2017), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files
/resources/pd.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V2W-44UQ].
112. See BARAN & MAGAÑA-SALGADO, supra note 109; see also LOCKHART & FORMAN,
supra note 62, at 22-24 (discussing remittances).
113. See Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP) – Haiti, WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=HT
[https://perma.cc/5UK3-KLBT] (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
114. See IMF, HAITI: 2019 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—PRESS RELEASE; STAFF
REPORT; AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR HAITI (Apr. 20, 2020)
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2020/English
/1HTIEA2020001.ashx
115. See generally, Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, Annie Georges & Susan Pozo. Migration,
Remittances, and Children’s Schooling in Haiti, 630 THE ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 224 (2014). As Susan Pozo’s current research of illustrates, remittances mediate the
access to higher education and social mobility among historically neglected and racialized
ethno-racial minorities in the Dominican Republic and Mexico. See NORMA FUENTESMAYORGA, FROM HOMEMAKERS, TO BREADWINNERS TO COMMUNITY LEADERS: A
LATINA FEMINIST VIEW AT MIGRATION (forthcoming).
116. Class Action Complaint at 7, Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d. 1083 (N.D. Cal.
filed Mar. 12, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01554).

26

Michigan Journal of Race & Law

[VOL.26:1

TPS holders have a mortgage. 117 Eighty-one percent of Haitian TPS
holders are employed and pay into the U.S. tax base. 118 During the
COVID-19 pandemic, more than 130,000 temporary protected status
holders from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti served as essential workers. 119 For these individuals, termination of TPS would mean substantial
financial costs to protect their assets and resettle to a country where they
may no longer have ties.120 For communities in the United States where
TPS holders live, it would mean the loss of parents, employers, employees, and people who make up the fabric of those communities.121
An additional concern for the cancellation of TPS is that those who
lose TPS will continue to live and work in the United States but as undocumented workers. 122 Many undocumented workers face significant
vulnerabilities to exploitation from their employers in the United States
given their employers’ threats of contacting immigration enforcement if
they do not comply. 123 Undocumented workers often face wage theft,
dangerous or hazardous working conditions, sexual harassment and exploitation in the workplace, and toxic, abusive working environments.124
For the foregoing reasons, cancellation of TPS for Haitians would
cause adverse humanitarian consequences that do not align with the purpose of TPS to temporarily protect individuals. In order to prevent future
harm, TPS—and the way the United States approaches past and future
immigration—should be reimagined. However, before reimagining the
future, advocates must first confront the United States’ long history of
117. See id. (citing Warren & Kerwin, supra note 107, at 583).
118. See Warren & Kerwin, supra note 107, at 582.
119. Prchal Svajlenka & Tom Jawetz, A Demographic Profile of TPS Holders Providing Essential Services During the Coronavirus Crisis, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://ampr.gs/3cnmrZH [https://perma.cc/WU38-HBMH].
120. See Complaint at 3-4, Centro Presente v. Trump, 332 F. Supp. 3d 393 (D. Mass.
filed Feb. 22, 2018) (No. 18-cv-10340).
121. Id.
122. See Jaqueline Charles, Haitian and Salvadoran TPS Holders Sue Trump Administration,
MIA. HERALD, (Feb. 22, 2018, 3:13 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/haiti/article201552444.html.
123. See REBECCA SMITH & EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT,
WORKERS’ RIGHTS ON ICE: HOW IMMIGRATION REFORM CAN STOP RETALIATION
AND ADVANCE LABOR RIGHTS (Feb. 2013), http://stage.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads
/2015/03/Workers-Rights-on-ICE-Retaliation-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ADQ26UCL] (discussing challenges undocumented workers face).
124. Id.; see also Eileen Appelbaum, Annette Bernhardt & Richard J. Murnane, LowWage America: How Employers Are Reshaping Opportunity in the Workplace, Jan. 2004, Indus.
& Lab. Rels. Rev.; NORMA FUENTES-MAYORGA, THE IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCES OF
DOMINICAN AND MEXICAN WOMEN IN THE 1990S: CROSSING BOUNDARIES OR
TEMPORARY WORK SPACES (2007); Nina Martin, Sandra Morales & Nick Theodore,
Migrant Worker Centers: Contending with Downgrading in the Low-Wage Labor Market. 68
GeoJournal 155 (2007).
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structural racism and prejudice against Haitians and other non-white immigrants. A number of recent lawsuits highlight how explicitly discriminatory the decision to rescind TPS for Haitians was and offer an example
of how to confront racist decision-making processes.
III. Uncovering the Wound: Legal Challenges to Cancellation
of TPS Due to Race-Based Discrimination
On January 24, 2018, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) filed a complaint in the U.S. District
Court of Maryland seeking to “enjoin DHS’s November 2017 decision
to rescind Temporary Protective Status (“TPS”) for Haitian immigrants,
as it reflects an egregious departure from the TPS statute’s requirements
and an intent to discriminate on the basis of race and/or ethnicity.”125
Following NAACP v. Department of Homeland Security, advocates in three
other federal cases—Saget v. Trump, 126 Centro Presente v. Trump, 127 and
Ramos v. Nielsen 128—challenged the termination of TPS for Haitians and
other minority TPS holders on multiple grounds, including Equal Protection grounds. 129 These claims assert multiple challenges to TPS termination, including that the decisions to terminate TPS were “motivated by

125. See Complaint at 239, NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d
568 (D. Md. filed Jan. 24, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00239).
126. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d
280 (E.D.N.Y filed Mar. 15, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01599).
127. Complaint, Centro Presente v. Trump, 332 F. Supp. 3d 393 (D. Mass. filed Feb.
22, 2018) (No. 18-cv-10340).
128. Class Action Complaint, Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d. 1083 (N.D. Cal. filed
Mar. 12, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01554).
129. See generally First Amended Complaint, Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280
(E.D.N.Y. filed May 31, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01599) 2018 WL 8344939 (outlining argument for race discrimination based on contemporaneous statements); Complaint at 22, 31
¶ 88, NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568 (D. Md. filed Jan.
24, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00239) (“the Administration’s departure from the normal decisionmaking process; the fact that the decision bears more heavily on one race than another;
the sequence of events leading to the decision; the contemporaneous statements of decision-makers; and the historical background of the decision.”). See also Complaint at 33,
Centro Presente v. Trump, 332 F. Supp. 3d 393 (D. Mass. filed Feb. 22, 2018) (No. 18cv-10340) (“The inference of race, ethnicity, and/or national origin discrimination is
supported by the Trump Administration’s departure from the normal decision-making
process; the fact that the decision bears more heavily on one race than another; the sequence of events leading to the decision; the contemporaneous statements of decisionmakers; and the historical background of the decision.”). Notably, other lawsuits have
also challenged the cancellation of TPS for other countries, but these suits do not include
Haitian TPS holders and are not discussed in this paper. see CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR.
NETWORK, INC., supra note 6.
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racism and racial, ethnic, and/or national origin discrimination.”130 To
prevail on a race-based discrimination claim, individuals are not required
to show that the discriminatory purpose was the sole or primary purpose
of the challenged action, only that it was a “motivating factor.”131 When
evaluating claims of intentional race-based discrimination, the Court considers both direct evidence of racial animus and circumstantial evidence
of discriminatory intent, including historical background, legislative and
/or administrative history, greater impact on one race than another, and
contemporary statements. 132 This Part briefly outlines the basic arguments
the cases present for a race-based Equal Protection claim. 133
A. Bleeding Direct Evidence of Harm: Anti-Immigrant Animus in
Rhetorically Racialized Politics
The theory that TPS’s cancellation was motivated by racial discrimination is supported by evidence of President Trump’s racial animus
against non-white, non-European individuals, since the White House
oversees such policy decisions. 134 In the suits challenging TPS cancella-

130. Complaint at 33, Centro Presente v. Trump, 332 F. Supp. 3d 393 at ¶ 107 (D.
Mass. filed Feb. 22, 2018) (No. 18-cv-10340).
131. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d. 1083 (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 23, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01554) (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977);
Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 2015)).
132. Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68.
133. Importantly, the Supreme Court held that the equal protection guarantee applies to
all persons in the United States. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
134. See Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020) (order granting preliminary injunction, noting an email exchange explaining that the decision to terminate “was
a political one” and instructions to “highlight [the] temporary nature” of TPS in breaking
with past practice). Additionally, a Senior Advisor to the Chief of OP&S (the division
within USCIS that writes USCIS recommendation on how to proceed regarding the TPS
Designation) responded to the Decision Memo for Haiti, stating: “The draft is overwhelming[ly] weighted for extension which I do not think is the conclusion we are looking for.” Id. at 1104. In the order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss in the Ramos
case, the Northern District of California noted: “Even if Acting Secretary Duke and Secretary Nielsen do not personally harbor animus towards TPS-beneficiaries from Haiti, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Sudan, their actions may violate the equal protection guarantee
if President Trump’s alleged animus influenced or manipulated their decision-making
process.” Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d. 1083, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The court in
Saget came to similar conclusions in its preliminary injunction. See Saget v. Trump, 375 F.
Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding, for example, that Acting DHS Secretary Duke’s
termination of TPS for Haiti was influenced by President Trump’s “America First” policy
of reducing the United States’ number of non-white immigrants). For a summary of the
preliminary injunction in Saget, see Press Release, Nat’l Immigr. Project, Federal Court
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tion, plaintiffs included Trump’s own comments both prior to and during
his term in their arguments for intentional racial discrimination. 135 Below,
we outline some of the President’s more egregious comments and actions
as non-exhaustive examples of his direct racial animus.136
Well before his political career began, Trump faced a lawsuit for
policies excluding Black tenants from apartment buildings he owned and
operated. 137 According to the former president of Trump Plaza Hotel and
Casino, Trump once stated, “laziness is a trait in the blacks.” 138 Trump
also claimed for years that former President Obama was not born in the
United States and used his support of the “birther” conspiracy and racist
stereotypes to play on societal fears in his 2016 presidential campaign.139

Blocks Trump’s Termination of Humanitarian Status for Haitians (Apr. 12, 2019),
available at https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/pr/2019_12Apr_haiti_tps.html
[https://perma.cc/7G5L-DF3B].
135. See First Amended Complaint, Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y.
filed May 31, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01599) (outlining argument for race discrimination based
on contemporaneous statements); Complaint, NAACP v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364
F. Supp. 3d 568 (D. Md. filed Jan. 24, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00239); Centro Presente v.
Trump, 332 F. Supp. 3d 393 (D. Mass. 2018); Complaint, Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F.
Supp. 3d. 1083 (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 12, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01554). For more examples
of such statements, see infra notes 137-50 and accompanying text. This section highlights
some of the more egregious statements made by the executive. In Ramos, the Court addressed the fact that Trump v. Hawaii does not apply in this case. “The case at bar is distinguishable from Trump in several respects. First, Defendants herein did not cite national
security as a basis for terminating TPS. . . . Second, unlike the Proclamation in Trump,
Defendants have not claimed that TPS has been terminated for foreign policy reasons. . . .
Third, the TPS-beneficiaries here, unlike those affected by the Proclamation in Trump,
are already in the U.S. Fourth, relatedly, aliens within the U.S. have greater constitutional
protections than those outside who are seeking admission for the first time. Fifth, the executive order at issue in Trump was issued pursuant to a very broad grant of statutory discretion . . . .” Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d. 1083, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020).
136. See infra notes 137-50 and accompanying text. This Article does not include all of
the racist remarks and actions cited in the complaint and also adds additional context not
cited in the complaints.
137. Decades-Old Housing Discrimination Case Plagues Donald Trump, NPR (Sep. 29, 2016
10:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/09/29/495955920/donald-trump-plagued-bydecades-old-housing-discrimination-case%20(discussing%20housing%20discrimination
%20case [https://perma.cc/W7U2-JTD5] (discussing housing discrimination case).
138. Nick Gass, The 15 Most Offensive Things that Have Come Out of Trump’s Mouth,
POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2015, 10:21 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/15-most-offensivethings-trump-campaign-feminism-migration-racism/ [https://perma.cc/G5UV-CVKL]
(discussing racist comments made by Trump).
139. See id.; see also German Lopez, Trump Is Still Reportedly Pushing His Racist “Birther”
Conspiracy Theory About Obama, VOX (Nov. 29, 2017, 10:40 AM), https://www.vox.com
/policy-and-politics/2017/11/29/16713664/trump-obama-birth-certificate
(discussing
birther conspiracy).
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Candidate Trump began his campaign with a direct, racist attack on
Mexican immigrants, calling them “rapists” and accusing them of bringing drugs and crime to the United States. 140 Later in his campaign, he reiterated this point, stating, “The Mexican government . . . send[s] the bad
ones over because they don’t want to pay for them.” 141 He questioned
the ability of District Judge Gonzalo Curiel to make a neutral decision in
a lawsuit because of his Mexican heritage, a comment Speaker of the
House Paul Ryan noted was “sort of like the textbook definition of a
racist comment.” 142 He also called for “a total and complete shutdown of
Muslims entering the U.S.” 143 Candidate Trump’s racist remarks continued with a racist tweet echoing false and manufactured statistics that
Black individuals commit 81 percent of the homicides of white individuals, a figure unsupported by official data (which notes the rate is actually
15 percent). 144
140. Complaint at 27, NAACP v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568 (D.
Md. filed Jan. 24, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00239); see also Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald
Trump’s False Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants and Crime, WASH. POST (Jul. 8,
2015 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08
/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/ (“When
Mexico sends its people . . . [t]hey’re sending people that have lots of problems, and
they’re bringing those problems . . . . They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime.
They’re rapists.”).
141. Andrew O’Reilly, At GOP Debate, Trump Says ‘Stupid’ U.S. Leaders are
Being Duped by Mexico, FOX NEWS (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.foxnews.com/politics
/at-gop-debate-trump-says-stupid-u-s-leaders-are-being-duped-by-mexico
[https://perma.cc/FHB9-8FZ4] (detailing comments by Trump regarding Mexico).
142. Complaint at 28, NAACP v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568 (D.
Md. filed Jan. 24, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00239) (citing Transcript of Face the Nation, CBS
NEWS (June 5, 2016, 12:57 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nationtranscripts-june-5-2016-trump/ [https://perma.cc/34FP-4S2K]; Jose A. DelReal & Katie
Zezima, Trump’s Personal, Racially Tinged Attacks on Federal Judge Alarm Legal Experts,
WASH. POST (June 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2016/06/01
/437ccae6-280b-11e6-a3c4-0724e8e24f3f_story.html?utm_term=.5c1816dc5543
(discussing Trump’s comments).
143. Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban All Muslim Travel to U.S., CNN (Dec. 8,
2015, 4:18 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslimban-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/PA4S-PEWS].
144. John Greenburg, Trump’s Pants on Fire Tweet That Blacks Killed 81% of White Homicide Victims, POLIFACT (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2015
/nov/23/donald-trump/trump-tweet-blacks-white-homicide-victims/ [https://perma.cc
/A6XX-E6DT] (noting “black on white” homicides, according to FBI data, are closer to
15 percent). For more on how the tweet perpetuated white supremacist talking points,
see Benedict Cosgrove, The Single, Four-Year-Old Tweet That Told Us Everything
We Were in for with Donald Trump, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 7, 2019)
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/donald-trump-tweet-black-white-crimealabama-hurricane-dorian-racist-a9095051.html (noting “the numbers aren’t just wrong;
they are wrong with intent. They are meant to frighten white people or, better yet, reinforce the assumptions of those who long ago bought into our founding lie: that African
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President Trump continued his anti-immigrant rhetoric during his
first week in office when he issued an executive order banning individuals from majority-Muslim countries and another creating the “Victims of
Immigration Crime Engagement” hotline, furthering the lie that immigrants perpetuate crime. 145 In a June 2017 private discussion on immigration, President Trump allegedly stated that Haitians “all have AIDS,”
echoing the pejorative racist stereotypes made against Haitians in the
1980s and 1990s. 146 During the same conversation, he noted that Nigerians, upon seeing the United States, would “never go back to their huts”
in Africa. 147
On January 11, 2018, President Trump asked, “Why are we having
all these people from shithole countries come here?” in response to reports of immigration from El Salvador, Haiti, and African nations.148 During the same meeting, individuals present reported that he stated, “Why
do we need more Haitians? . . . Take them out.” 149 The comments juxtaposed with statements urging the United States to admit more immigrants from countries “like Norway.” 150 In the context of so many racist
comments against Black Americans and immigrants of color, it came as
little surprise when the Trump administration cancelled TPS for Haitians.
B. Telltale Signs of Infection: Circumstantial Evidence in the Departure from the
Previous TPS Renewal Process
The decision-making process leading to TPS in 2017 differed greatly from previous decisions to extend TPS for Haiti, and evidence suggests
Americans are inherently violent and pose a constant threat to pale, god-fearing folk.”).
Cosgrove goes on to note, “Ultimately the specific numbers in Trump’s tweet don’t matter. What does matter is that a major-party candidate for president of the U.S. re-tweeted
a racist load of crap from a suspicious, seemingly neo-Nazi Twitter stream — and 10,000plus followers “liked” it.” Id.
145. See Victims of Immigrant Crime Engagement (VOICE) Office, U.S. IMMIGR. AND
CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/voice [https://perma.cc/FHZ9-HA27] (website
for victims of immigrant crime) (last visited Nov. 7, 2020); see also Exec. Order No.
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (banning travel to U.S. from individuals
from Majority-Muslim nations).
146. See Shear and Davis, supra note 4 (discussing racist remarks reportedly made during
meeting with president). “[O]fficials strenuously insisted that Mr. Trump never used the
words “AIDS” or “huts” to describe people from any country. [B]ut the two officials
who described the comments found them so noteworthy that they related them to others
at the time.” Id.
147. Id.
148. See Dawsey, supra note 5 (discussing comments made during a meeting on immigration).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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that one difference was that race was a motivating factor in the government’s decision to cancel TPS for Haitians. 151 Under Arlington Heights,
there are multiple factors to consider when deciding if there was discriminatory intent, including the “impact of the official action – whether it
bears more heavily on one race than another”; the “historical background
of the decision” and the “specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision”; and “[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence.” 152 As Part II of this Article provides an outline of the history of
TPS and the impact of cancellation on Haitians, this current Part focuses
on the departure from the previous TPS renewal process. The cases challenging TPS demonstrate how the departure from regular process and the
racist motivations in that process are key factors within the Arlington
Heights analysis of race-based discrimination.153
From 2011 to 2016, each presiding Secretary of Homeland Security
consulted with international organizations and considered conditions in
Haiti in making each of their decisions.154 Each decision to extend TPS
was then published in the Federal Register within several days of the decision. 155 The 2017 decision followed no such protocol, but rather the
administration sought crime and welfare information based on racial ste156
reotypes.
In the decisions to extend TPS prior to 2017, previous Secretaries
of Homeland Security noted the scale of damage, the number of people
internally displaced, the impact of the cholera outbreak, the rates of mal151. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.
152. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-67
(1977) (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. See generally First Amended Complaint, Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280
(E.D.N.Y. filed May 31, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01599); Complaint at 7-15, NAACP v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568 (D. Md. filed Jan. 24, 2018) (No. 18-cv00239); Complaint at 33, Centro Presente v. Trump, 332 F. Supp. 3d 393 (D. Mass. filed
Feb. 22, 2018) (No. 18-cv-10340); Class Action Complaint, Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F.
Supp. 3d. 1083 (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 12, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01554).
154. See, e.g., Complaint at 7-15, NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F.
Supp. 3d 568 (D. Md. filed Jan. 24, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00239) (noting agencies consulted
with and conditions leading to decision to extend TPS designation for Haiti);. Extension
of the Redesignation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,000 (May
19, 2011) [hereinafter “2011 Extension”] (describing conditions leading to extension of
TPS); Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 77 Fed.
Reg. 59,943 (Oct. 1, 2012) [hereinafter “2012 Extension”] (same); Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 79 Fed. Reg. 11,808 (Mar. 3, 2014)
[hereinafter “2014 Extension”] (same); Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 80 Fed. Reg. 51,582 (Aug. 25, 2015) [hereinafter “2015 Extension”] (same).
155. Complaint at 7-15, NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568
(D. Md. filed Jan. 24, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00239);
156. See supra Part II.B.
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nutrition, and the portion of the population living below the poverty
line. 157 The decisions took into account the political instability in Haiti
and the country’s inability to provide adequate social services, infrastruc158
ture, education, or healthcare. The impacts of Hurricane Sandy and
Tropical Storm Isaac influenced later extensions, along with the fact that
the 2010 earthquake “exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities, including
gender-based violence, trafficking, sexual exploitation, child labor, domestic violence, and recruitment into crime or violence.” 159 For example,
the 2014 decision noted that the “extraordinary and temporary conditions that led to Haiti’s designations continue to exist and prevent Haitian
nationals . . . from returning to Haiti in safety.”160
During the consideration to extend TPS in 2017, a U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services memo noted that “[m]any of the conditions
prompting the original January 2010 TPS designation persist, and the
country remains vulnerable to external shocks and internal fragility.” 161 A
large portion of the documents involved in the decision-making process
were later redacted, making it difficult to determine the other factors that
played into the decision. 162 The decision to terminate TPS did not appear
to take account of factors including the gender-based violence in the
internally displaced persons camps, the population’s lack of access to
fundamental health and nutritional services, the destruction from the
earthquake, the impact of hurricanes since 2010, or food insecurity. 163 As
Centro Presente argues, the decision deviated from INA § 244(b)(3)’s and 8
U.S.C. § 1254a’s requirement that DHS “undertake a genuine, good
faith review of the conditions in a foreign country designated for TPS to

157. See, e.g., 2011 Extension, supra note 154 (describing conditions leading to extension of TPS; extending TPS from July 23, 2011 through January 22, 2013); 2012 Extension, supra note 154 (extending TPS through July 22, 2014); 2015 Extension, supra note
154 (noting conditions in Haiti, including “malnutrition rates higher than emergency
thresholds” and extending TPS from January 23, 2016 through July 22, 2017).
158. See, e.g., 2014 Extension, supra note 154 (extending TPS from July 23, 2014
through January 22, 2016).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., TPS CONSIDERATIONS:
HAITI (OCTOBER 2017) NATURAL DISASTER, BACKGROUND & OVERVIEW 26-43
https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/our_lit/impact
_litigation/2018_Jun_USCIS-foia-tps-haiti.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7LP-92S4].
162. See Tal Kopan, DHS Decision to End Haitian Immigrant Protections Questioned,
CNN (Apr. 17, 2018, 3:57 PM) https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/17/politics/haiti-tpsdocuments-questions/index.html [https://perma.cc/X2CZ-52L8] (discussing results of
Freedom of Information Act request).
163. See, e.g., Complaint at 24-26, NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F.
Supp. 3d 568 (D. Md. filed Jan. 24, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00239).
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determine whether the conditions for designation continue to be met.”164
In the 2017 publication in the Federal Register, then-Secretary Duke did
not cite which “U.S. government agency” DHS consulted with in
making the decision to cancel TPS. 165 This differs from other previous
notices in the Federal Register, which referenced consultations with the
Department of State. 166 As the NAACP v. Department of Homeland Security
Complaint notes, “DHS departed from the normal decision-making
process in deciding to rescind Haitian TPS by failing to engage the
factors identified in the original determination, the factors identified in
the four subsequent 18-month extensions, and the factors that Mr. Kelly
identified in his extension just five months earlier.” 167 Saget and Ramos
raise similar concerns. 168
Furthermore, as mentioned previously, DHS requested information
on the number of TPS recipients receiving welfare and accused of criminal activity. 169 As the NAACP v. Department of Homeland Security Complaint argues, the attempts to gather data on Haitian TPS holders’ crimes
and use of public benefits play “on false anti-Black stereotypes about
criminality and exploitation of public benefits, and suggests the effort to
manufacture a public safety rationale for the planned rescission.” 170 These
significant changes to the TPS decision-making process provide circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination.

164. Complaint at 33, Centro Presente v. Trump, 332 F. Supp. 3d 393 (D. Mass. filed
Feb. 22, 2018) (No. 18-cv-10340).
165. See Termination of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 83
Fed. Reg. 2648 (Jan. 18, 2018).
166. See Complaint at 23, NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d
568 (D. Md. filed Jan. 24, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00239) (“The January 18, 2018, notice does
not indicate whether DHS consulted with the Department of State before the rescission.”).
167. See Complaint at 26, NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d
568 (D. Md. filed Jan. 24, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00239).
168. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Saget v. Trump, 375 F.
Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01599) (Prelim. Injunction Order filed Apr. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/JJ9Y-3VM9]. See generally Complaint at 1,
Centro Presente v. Trump, 332 F. Supp. 3d 393 (D. Mass. filed Feb. 22, 2018) (No. 18cv-10340); Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d. 1083
(N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 12, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01554). See also Press Release, Nat’l Immigr.
Project, Federal Court Blocks Trump’s Termination of Humanitarian Status for Haitians
(Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/pr/2019_12Apr_haiti
_tps.html [https://perma.cc/7G5L-DF3B].
169. See Caldwell, supra note 82 (discussing information sought on Haitians regarding
welfare and crime).
170. Complaint at 26, NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568
(D. Md. filed Jan. 24, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00239).
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IV. Assessing the Injury: The Impact of Legal Challenges
The aforementioned litigation challenging TPS cancellation provides an important framework for understanding the benefits, but also the
significant limitations, of impact litigation in producing outcomes that
protect historically marginalized groups. The preliminary injunctions in
Ramos and Saget, along with other litigation seeking to halt executive orders revoking protections for immigrants, may provide a hopeful prologue for the success of claims challenging the cancellation of TPS for
Haitians. 171 Additionally, although the outcome of such claims is far from
certain, the injunctions have been influential in extending TPS-related
documentation and TPS status, and they could create precedent requiring
additional scrutiny of such executive decisions or, at the very least, create
a judicial record of the mistreatment of Haitians and other TPS beneficiaries. 172
In the preliminary injunction issued in Saget, the Eastern District of
New York ruled that the plaintiffs were likely to prove that DHS was influenced by the administration’s political motivations to terminate TPS
171. See Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d. 1083
(N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 12, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01554) (Order Granting Preliminary Injunction filed Oct. 3, 2018); State v. Trump, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1063 (D. Haw. 2017),
aff’d, 871 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017) (enjoining enforcement of Executive Order No.
13,780); see also Regents of Univ. of California v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F.
Supp. 3d 1011, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (enjoining cancellation of DACA renewal); CATH.
LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC., supra note 6; Ramos v. Nielsen, ACLU OF SOUTHERN
CAL., https://www.aclusocal.org/en/cases/ramos-v-nielsen [https://perma.cc/XR9HGGDW] (last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
172. See Continuation of Documentation for Beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status Designations for El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Sudan, Honduras, and Nepal, 85 Fed.
Reg. 79,208 (Dec. 9, 2020); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 10 (noting
that, due to injunctions in several court cases “USCIS will extend, through Oct. 4, 2021,
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and the validity of certain TPS-related documentation.”). The USCIS page also notes, “as required by the orders in Saget and Ramos, the
TPS designation for Haiti remains in effect pending further court order. Beneficiaries under the TPS designation for Haiti will maintain their status.” Id. Notably, there is an extensive body of case law that records the treatment of Haitians and, in some cases, requires enjoining deportation. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1488 (11th Cir.
1983) (recording disproportionate rates of detention of Haitian immigrants); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff’d sub nom. Haitian Refugee
Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting Haitians unlawfully denied right to
present asylum claims and removed from the United States without due process); Louis v.
Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924, 926 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (noting denial of due process by sending
Haitians to remote areas of United States to be detained); Sannon v. United States, 460 F.
Supp. 458 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (discussing denial of notice in removal hearings); Nat’l Council of Churches v. Egan, No. 79-cv-02959 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (discussing denial of right to
work while asylum claims pending and denial of access to information to support their
asylum claim).
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and did not conduct a good-faith, evidence-based review of facts on the
ground to determine whether to extend Haiti’s TPS. 173 Moreover, Judge
Kuntz ruled that the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the claim that the
Trump Administration terminated TPS for Haiti based on racial animus. 174
In Ramos, 175 the Northern District of California issued a preliminary
injunction blocking the termination of legal status for beneficiaries of
TPS from El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Sudan. 176 The injunction
provides TPS holders the right to remain in the United States until the
court rules otherwise. 177 In the decision, the court observed that “not only
is there direct evidence of animus, but there is also circumstantial evidence of race being a motivating factor.”178 However, in September 2020,
the Ninth Circuit vacated the case and remanded the case to the District
Court. 179 With regard to the Equal Protection claim, the Ninth Circuit
found that, “While the district court’s findings that President Trump expressed racial animus against “nonwhite, non-European” immigrants, and
that the White House influenced the TPS termination decisions, are supported by record evidence, the district court cites no evidence linking the
President’s animus to the TPS terminations.” 180
Even if the legal claims are not successful, they raise creative arguments challenging the cancellation of TPS. 181 These challenges and judg173. See generally id. See also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 22,
Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01599)
(“[DHS] failed to explain how—in less than a year—Haiti had managed to overcome the
seven key justifications identified by DHS in December 2016 to maintain TPS.”).
174. Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 373-74 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
175. Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d. 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 31. The court further noted, “Plaintiffs have provided evidence indicating
that (1) the DHS Acting Secretary or Secretary was influenced by President Trump and
/or the White House in her TPS decision-making and (2) President Trump has expressed
animus against non-white, non-European immigrants.” Id. at 27.
179. Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020). The Ninth Circuit held that, “(1)
judicial review of Plaintiffs’ claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is
barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A); and (2) Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of
success, or even serious questions, on the merits of their Equal Protection claim.” Id. at 1,
available at https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/09/14/18-16981.pdf.
180. Id. at 49. As of the publication of this paper, the ACLU has stated that it will appeal. See What’s Next for TPS Holders? ACLU OF SOUTHERN CAL.,
https://www.aclusocal.org/en/know-your-rights/whats-next-tps-holders
[https://perma.cc/WS5Y-4DW7] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020).
181. For example, the cases assert violations of Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 106-13, Saget v.
Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01599) (noting
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es’ responses will create a body of case law that future litigants can use to
form successful litigation strategies.182 Additionally, the Complaints call
attention to the racially motivated decision to cancel TPS for Haitians
and other groups and the reproduction of racialized policies in immigration regulations. Furthermore, laws and lawsuits make a statement about
what is important to a society and worth litigating. As such, there is an
inherent value in challenging a decision to cancel protections for a group
of people based on racist beliefs and a failure to consider evidence of ongoing harm in their country.
However, even if these claims are successful in enjoining the cancellation of TPS, a victory in court will not address the systemic, economic, and political inequalities that destabilized the economic, agricultural, and political landscape in Haiti which makes it so difficult for the
country to recover after national disasters.183 It is also possible that the cases might be resolved on other grounds and therefore fail to address or resolve the injustice of racial discrimination that the Plaintiffs allege. Lawsuits enjoining the cancellation of TPS do not address the fact that TPS
itself is a broken system. Continued extensions of TPS relegate recipients
of such visas to second-class residents with no stability and a status at the
whim of the administration in power.
True change requires the United States to examine its thorny racial
history and consider creative ways to reconcile past wrongdoing. As discussed above, impact litigation has real limitations in accomplishing this
goal. The following Part considers the impact of cancellation of TPS on
the Haitian community and proposes that reparations and remittances offer a framework to approach TPS moving forward.

“Defendants’ termination of Haitian TPS arbitrarily deprives current TPS recipients of the
process to which they are entitled.”); see also Complaint at ¶ 137, Centro Presente v.
Trump, 332 F. Supp. 3d 393 (D. Mass. filed Feb. 22, 2018) (No. 18-cv-10340) (“The
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment also prohibits irrational government action.”) (citing U.S. Dep´t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532-33 (1973)). These cases also assert violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, see, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 114-19, Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280
(E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 2018) (No. 18-cv-01599) (challenging cancellation of TPS
based on lack of ability to participate in rule by submitting data, views or arguments as
required by 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c)), and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, see, e.g., id. at ¶¶
120-24 (“DHS failed to conduct any regulatory flexibility analysis to determine how the
termination of Haitian TPS will affect small entities, such as Haiti Liberteǋ, in violation of
the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)”).
182. See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
183. See supra Part I.B (noting history of Haitian-United States relations).
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V. Cleaning the Wound: Viewing TPS Through the Lens of
Reparations and Remittances
Lawyer and Professor Mari J. Matsuda states that “[t]he dissonance
of combining deep criticism of law with an aspirational vision of law is
184
part of the experience of people of color.”
In order to consider the best way to approach TPS going forward,
policymakers must consider the criticisms of the current system, listen to
the experiences of TPS recipients, and aspire to imagine and work towards a more just future. To envision a different future, it is important to
understand that Haiti’s inability to recover from natural disasters and develop politically and economically is largely due to unfettered interference from the United States. 185 To truly take into account the impact that
U.S. immigration policy has on countries with TPS recipients, changes
and extensions to the program should be viewed through the lens of first
recognizing the harm done through past immigration policies and then
creatively thinking reparations and remittances.186
A. Recognizing the Harm Done to People Raced as Black:
“Now Never Begins Yesterday.” 187
In order to truly address the issue of racism, particularly as it applies
to immigration policies like TPS and its continuing impact on Black

184. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 333 (“Members of the dominant class continue to benefit
from the wrongs of the past and the presumptions of inferiority imposed upon victims.”).
185. See Andrew Buncombe, 50,000 Haitians Face Being Deported by Trump Back to
Country Still Reeling from Natural Disasters, INDEPENDENT (May 1, 2017),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-haiti-immigrantsdeportations-threat-disasters-a7712346.html (noting political interference by the United
States in Haiti).
186. See, e.g., Joseph Nevins, Migration as Reparations, NORTH AM. CONG. ON LATIN
AM. (May 24, 2016), https://nacla.org/blog/2016/05/24/migration-reparations
[https://perma.cc/F4BF-DTPY] (“[A] basic concept of justice demands recognition that
migration involving the movement of people from exploited and relatively impoverished
parts of the world to countries of relative wealth and privilege, is, or at least should be, a
right born of debt—an imperial debt. The right to migration, in other words, is a form of
reparations.”).
187. RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 6 (2001). I
have taken the liberty to use the term “raced as black,” as used by Professor Taunya Lovell Banks, to recognize the fact that race is a social construction assigned to individuals.
See Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance to Racial Reconciliation in the U.S., 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 903, 911 (2003) (“Non-prejudiced whites, I argue, resist black reparations efforts because they are ignorant of the nature and condition of African slavery, de
jure segregation, and the continuing vestiges of public and private discrimination against
people raced as black in the U.S.”).
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people and people of color in the United States, the country must first be
honest about the historical harms done by white people in power to
those seen as “other.” Lawyer and Critical Race Theory Professor Derrick Bell has noted, “Despite having completed the vital task of eliminating Jim Crow racial classifications, legal institutions still operate with a
perspective that remains perceptually, analytically, and functionally colorcoded.” 188 Changing the narrative around immigration to include a
recognition of past harms and their continued impact on racialized groups
creates a chance for healing to occur. 189 As lawyer and activist Randall
Robinson has noted, “To set afoot a new and whole black woman and
man we must first tell the victims what happened to them.” 190 In his conception of reparations Author Ta-Nehisi Coates observes:
Reparations—by which I mean the full acceptance of our collective biography and its consequences—is the price we must
pay to see ourselves squarely. The recovering alcoholic may
well have to live with his illness for the rest of his life. But at
least he is not living a drunken lie. Reparations beckons us to
reject the intoxication of hubris and see America as it is—the
work of fallible humans.191
As both Coates and Robinson recognize, a collective recognition of the
racial harm and history of the United States is the first step towards an
honest effort at amending the harm done. Part of recognizing the harm
and retelling—or, more accurately put, realistically telling—the story of
U.S. immigration history and its critical intersection with race is including the voices of those who have been excluded from scholarly conversations but who are most impacted by immigration policy decisions. 192 In

188. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 5, 58 (1987).
189. See Magee, supra note 19, at 305 (“By fleshing out the experiences of early African
Americans as forced migration immigrants, enslaved workers, and free people (some of
whom were exercising the right to vote at the time of the Constitution’s ratification), we
might begin the articulation of a new, more inclusive narrative, one that understands this
nation as having been strengthened by the contributions of people of diverse backgrounds
from the beginning.”).
190. See ROBINSON, supra note 187.
191. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations
/361631/ [https://perma.cc/L2YR-7SCZ] (discussing arguments in support of reparations for African Americans).
192. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 551 (discussing “ivory tower” of scholarship around
race and immigration and discussing immigration literature and prevalence of white male
scholars); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections On a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 563-64 (1984) (“When the inner circle writers
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addressing the harm the United States has done to Haiti in particular, it is
important to recognize, as the scholar Westenley Alcenat once heard a
Haitian street vendor say, “If we were not punished for our independence long ago, we would have had a better time.”193
B. Stitching up the Injury: Reparations
Reparations for Haiti are especially important because the United
States historically supported France’s demand’s for Haiti to pay “reparations” to France for the freedom granted to the enslaved people, “thus
distorting the essence and meaning of reparative justice for 100 years.”194
In order to achieve just immigration, the United States must address the
racism in its past and current systems, policies, institutions, and individuals. 195 Reparations are one such way to provide an acknowledgement for
harm done and a commitment to work towards righting the wrong.196
The National Coalition for Black Reparations in America defines reparations as “a process of repairing, healing and restoring a people injured because of their group identity and in violation of their fundamental human
rights by governments, corporations, institutions, and families.” 197 International Legal Advisor Emanuela-Chiara Gillard notes, “The aim of reparation is to eliminate, as far as possible, the consequences of the illegal act
and to restore the situation that would have existed if the act had not
been committed. Reparation can take various forms, including restitution, compensation or satisfaction.” 198 Professor Mari Matsuda explains
that “[r]eparations claims are based on continuing stigma and economic
harm . . . . [T]he injuries suffered—deprivation of land, resources, eduneed authority for a factual or social scientific proposition about race they generally cite
reports of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights or else each other.”).
193. See Alcenat, supra note 48 (quoting Haitian street vendor).
194. See Campbell, supra note 41.
195. See LEAH WISE & GERALD LENOIR, BLACK ALL. FOR JUST IMMIGR. & SOUTHEAST
REG’L ECON. JUST. NETWORK, BLACK VOICES CALL FOR NEW APPROACHES TO
IMMIGRATION REFORM 3 https://www.racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/BLACKVOICES-CALL-FOR-NEW-APPROACHES-TO-IMMIGRATION-REFORM.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SFS8-74G6] (outlining just immigration reform agenda and noting
“just immigration cannot be accomplished without addressing systemic policies as well as
individual, institutional and structural racism.”)
196. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 395 (“The judgment states, ‘Something terrible has
happened for which we are responsible. While no amount can compensate for your loss,
we offer here a symbol of our deep regret and our continuing obligation.’”)
197. Reparations – Learn About Reparations for Blacks in America, NAT’L COALITION OF
BLACKS FOR REPARATIONS IN AM., http://www.ncobraonline.org/reparations/
[https://perma.cc/7YBR-TM7Z] (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
198. Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Reparation for Violations of International Humanitarian Law,
85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 529, 531 (2003).
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cational opportunity, person-hood, and political recognition—are disabilities that have precluded successful presentation of the claim at an earlier
time.” 199 Reparations arise under the legal obligation to make victims
whole and are traditionally broken down into two categories: 1) material
reparations, such as monetary awards or social welfare programs, and 2)
non-material or symbolic reparations, such as formal apologies.200
The United States has supported reparations in the past. 201 For example, the United States paid reparations to victims of Japanese internment and created a board, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians (CWRIC), which assessed how to extend reparations, who to extend reparations to, and when to create monuments and
days of remembrance for formerly interned Japanese individuals.202 In its
findings supporting a need for reparations, the CWRIC reported a history of anti-Japanese sentiment and legislation, restrictions on Japanese immigration, and refusal of U.S.-citizenship for Japanese descendants well
before internment camps began. 203 The Civil Liberties Act of 1988,
which granted reparations to individuals of Japanese ancestry (and to Aleut villages), included many principles of reparations.204 The Act’s purposes include: (1) an acknowledgement of the injustices; (2) an apology
for the action; (3) provision of a “public education fund to finance efforts
to inform the public about the internment of such individuals so as in199. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 381-82.
200. See Gillard, supra note 198; see also David C. Gray, A No-Excuse Approach to Transitional Justice: Reparations as Tools of Extraordinary Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1043, 105455 (2010) (discussing forms of reparations); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 727-29
(2003);. see also Tamar Lewin, Calls for Slavery Restitution Getting Louder, N.Y. TIMES (June
4, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/04/us/calls-for-slavery-restitution-gettinglouder.html (discussing claims for reparations for African Americans).
201. Adeel Hassan & Jack Healy, America Has Tried Reparations Before. Here Is How It
Went, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/us
/reparations-slavery.html; see also Erin Blakemore, The Thorny History of Reparations in the
U.S., HISTORY.COM (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/reparationsslavery-native-americans-japanese-internment [https://perma.cc/62FN-QEZ8].
202. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 381-82.
203. COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS,
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 1-23 (1st ed. 1983).
204. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903, 903 (Aug. 10.
1988). The Act also aims to “make restitution to Aleut residents of the Pribilof Islands and
the Aleutian Islands west of Unimak Island, in settlement of United States obligations in
equity and at law, for (A) injustices suffered and unreasonable hardships endured while
those Aleut residents were under United States control during World War II; (B) personal
property taken or destroyed by United States forces during World War II; (C) community property, including community church property, taken or destroyed by United States
forces during World War II; and (D) traditional village lands on Attu Island not rehabilitated after World War II for Aleut occupation or other productive use.” Id.
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formation to prevent the recurrence of any similar event;” (4) restitution
to those who were interned; and (5) instructions to “discourage the occurrence of similar injustices and violations of civil liberties in the future.” 205
Traditionally, a reparation claim is presented as follows: “Plaintiff
Class A (victim group members) v. Defendant Class B (perpetrator descendants and current beneficiaries of past injustice).” 206 In the case of
Haitian TPS holders, the victim group members would be the Haitians
who have suffered from years of U.S. interference in their country, stereotypes in the United States regarding HIV/AIDS, job loss with the uncertainty surrounding TPS extension, and family strain as a result of almost a decade of an immigration status that is extended every eighteen
months. 207 The United States has contributed to the political unrest and
instability in Haiti and continues to benefit from taxes paid by TPS recipients and contributions to the U.S. economy by such recipients.208
The United States could offer both material and non-material reparations to Haitians—particularly Haitian TPS holders—in the form of
205. In Title II, the same Act also aims to “make restitution to Aleut residents of the
Pribilof Islands and the Aleutian Islands west of Unimak Island, in settlement of United
States obligations in equity and at law, for (A) injustices suffered and unreasonable hardships endured while those Aleut residents were under United States control during World
War II; (B) personal property taken or destroyed by United States forces during World
War II; (C) community property, including community church property, taken or destroyed by United States forces during World War II; and (D) traditional village lands on
Attu Island not rehabilitated after World War II for Aleut occupation or other productive
use.” Id.
206. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 375. “Plaintiffs operating under a disability are not
required to press their claims until the disability is removed; a continuing wrong does not
start the clock running under a statute of limitation until the wrong culminates in an act
of fraud in concealing the availability of or grounds for an action is another standard exception. All of these exceptions apply to claims for reparations.” Id. at 381. “Reparations
claims are based on continuing stigma and economic harm. The wounds are fresh and the
action timely given ongoing discrimination. Furthermore, the injuries suffered—
deprivation of land, resources, educational opportunity, person-hood, and political recognition—are disabilities that have precluded successful presentation of the claim at an earlier time. Outright fraud and factual misrepresentation have also delayed presentation of
claims.” Id. at 381–82.
207. See Alcenat, supra note 48 (discussing the case for reparations).
208. See, e.g., Nevins, supra note 186 (“a basic concept of justice demands recognition
that migration involving the movement of people from exploited and relatively impoverished parts of the world to countries of relative wealth and privilege, is, or at least should
be, a right born of debt—an imperial debt. The right to migration, in other words, is a
form of reparations.”). Importantly, there is a humanitarian need to grant individuals the
right to stay in the United States and the case for reparations does not negate the real need
of many who apply for a right to remain, live, and work in the United States, regardless
of where they are from. See e.g., Frelick, supra note 71. See also supra Part I.B. (discussing
history of U.S. interference in Haiti).
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various immigration relief and policies. Non-material reparations could
include a formal apology to the nation of Haiti for past wrongs, a study of
the impact of past policies on Haitians and Haitian immigrants, and guaranteed inclusion of Haitians in future decisions about TPS extensions. A
study of the impact that adverse immigration policies have had on Haiti
and Haitian immigrants would be an important first step in reparations
and giving stronger consideration to the international impact of U.S.
immigration policy.
Material reparations could include extending TPS, offering a pathway for citizenship, and offering Haitian TPS recipients benefits to programs which they are currently excluded from, such as Medicaid and unemployment benefits. 209 Such policies would be akin to the benefits that
were offered to Cubans from 1966 to 2016 under the CAA or an adjustment of status provision which was briefly available to Haitians under the
Carter administration. 210 These material reparations would specifically address the harm done.211
Another form of material reparations could be reforming TPS entirely and providing a framework to prevent future actions based on racial
animus. 212 Some have suggested that the United States could reform the
system for granting TPS by creating a TPS board to weigh the merits of a
TPS extension, rather than having TPS decided by a political appointee
such as the Secretary of Homeland Security. 213 The TPS board could
monitor human rights situations, consult with various NGOs and state
agencies, and hold hearings to fully understand the perspective of indi-

209. For an approach to concretely reforming TPS, see Frelick, supra note 71 (proposing
changes to U.S. refugee law that would “provide individualized complementary protection to people outside their countries who are not able to meet the 1951 Refugee Convention standard but who face a serious threat to life or physical integrity if returned because of a real risk of (1) cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (2)
violence; or (3) exceptional situations, for which there is no adequate domestic remedy.”).
210. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. See WASEM, supra note 56, at 5 (“an
adjustment of status provision was included in the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) of 1986 (P.L. 99-603) that enabled the Cuban-Haitian Entrants who had arrived
during the Mariel Boatlift to become LPRs.”)
211. See id. See also Part I.B and Part II.B-C (discussing harmful immigration policies
and the specific harm caused by cancelling TPS).
212. See infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
213. See Anchors, supra note 70, at 595 (discussing possible TPS board); see also Ari
Weitzhandler, Temporary Protected Status: The Congressional Response to the Plight of Salvadoran Aliens, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 249, 275 (1993) (suggesting alternatives for granting
TPS).
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viduals with TPS. 214 A board re-designating TPS would ideally include
members of the community who would receive TPS as part of its decision-making body. 215 Such a board would not be as politically swayed as
current actors are because they could be appointed and only removable
for particular reasons. 216 Additionally, a small board could act quickly.217
Like any political body, the board would not be perfect and could have
biases or be influenced by lobbying.218 Transparency would help counter
these issues, as could a concrete set of criteria to be analyzed when granting and extending TPS. 219 As the U.S. House of Representatives discussed and ultimately wrote into the language of the American Dream
and Promise Act of 2019, the law surrounding TPS should be amended
to provide a pathway to legal permanent residence for TPS holders who
have lived in and contributed to the United States for extended periods,
which would further contribute to family unity and more permanently
integrate TPS holders into U.S. society. 220 These material and nonmaterial reparations could be a small step in righting past wrongs and rethinking the future of TPS and Haitian-U.S. relations.
C. Recovery Through Rethinking Aid: Remittances
Granting and extending TPS allows Haitians in the United States to
contribute to their country’s development through remittances, as TPS
allows these individuals to legally participate in the U.S. labor force. Remittances are funds which are sent to the home country of an immigrant

214. See Anchors, supra note 70, at 596 (citing Stephen H. Legomsky, The Making of
U.S. Refugee Policy: Separation of Powers in the Post-Cold War Era, 70 WASH. L. REV. 675,
699 (1995)).
215. For example, in extending TPS for Haiti, Haitians in the United States with TPS
would be consulted. Id.
216. Id. at 596 (discussing benefits of TPS board).
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 597 (discussing benefits of transparency and explicit criteria in TPS, including a more rapid response time); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 64, at 373 (“The factors examined by the Departments of State and Justice in advising the Attorney General
[now Secretary of DHS] in making her periodic decisions on TPS are often unclear.”); see
also Alice Jackson Smith, Temporary Safe Haven for De Facto Refugees from War, Violence and
Disasters, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 509, 542 (1988) (suggesting considerations for protection).
220. See American Promise Act of 2019, H.R. 6, 116th Cong. § 211(b)(1)(A), (B).; see
also HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S. 156-60 (2006) (discussing situation of immigrants in the United States, contributing to United States society, and seeking a more
permanent status). See also Gillard, supra note 198, at 529-53.
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living and working abroad. 221 Remittance flows worldwide are more than
three times that of official development aid. 222 According to 2019 data,
remittances to Haiti made up 38.9 percent of Haiti’s GDP.223 To facilitate
remittances, the United States could encourage regulations that make
sending money abroad less costly.224
Providing Haitians in the United States with the ability to continue
to work legally ensures a more stable source of economic support to Haiti
than another type of aid program.225 Previous aid programs in Haiti have
created a dependency on foreign NGOs that pay the government little
heed and use foreign contractors instead of local expertise. 226 Additionally,
foreign aid programs spend much of their funds on flying “experts” to
Haiti and paying staff bonuses for “hardship pay” and “danger pay.”227
One study noted that less than a penny of every dollar dedicated to Haitian relief efforts through USAID actually went to a Haitian organization. 228

221. See Dilip Ratha, Remittances: Funds for the Folks Back Home, IMF,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/remitt.htm [https://perma.cc/YQ767AN2] (last updated Feb. 24, 2020) (outlining importance of remittances).
222. See Drew Desilver, Remittances from Abroad Are Major Economic Assets for Some Developing Countries, PEW RSCH CTR. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/01/29/remittances-from-abroad-are-major-economic-assets-for-somedeveloping-countries/ [https://perma.cc/U8EC-MMS4] (discussing role remittances play
in developing nations).
223. Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP) – Haiti 2019, WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=HT
[https://perma.cc/5UK3-KLBT] (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
224. See Ben Schiller, The Fight for the $400 Billion Business of Immigrants Sending Money
Home, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3067778/theblockchain-is-going-to-save-immigrants-millions-in-remittance-fees
[https://perma.cc
/P4WU-Q9GD] (discussing quantity of remittances sent yearly and cost of doing so).
225. See id. (discussing remittances); see also Elizabeth Nisbet & William M. Rogers III,
The Earnings Gap Between Undocumented and Documented U.S Farmworkers: 1990 to 2009
(Nat’l Poverty Ctr., Working Paper No. 13-07, 2003), http://npc.umich.edu
/publications/u/2013-07-npc-working-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YQU-W568] (discussing gap in earnings between documented and undocumented immigrants).
226. Cécile Barbière, Development Expert: ‘Haiti Would Be Better Off Without International
Aid,’ EURACTIVE (May 30, 2017), https://www.euractiv.com/section/developmentpolicy/interview/un-expert-haiti-would-be-better-off-without-international-aid/
[https://perma.cc/4WPG-UGYA]; see also Gillard, supra note 198, at 529-53.
227. See Jake Johnson, Outsourcing Haiti, BOS. REV. (Jan. 16, 2014),
http://bostonreview.net/world/jake-johnston-haiti-earthquake-aid-caracol
[https://perma.cc/9WTD-42UV] (discussing aid in Haiti); see also Gillard, supra note 198.
228. See id. (“While bad governance, corruption, incompetent bureaucracy, power
struggles, and waste contributed to the ineffective use of aid, what happened in Haiti has
more to do with the damage caused by putting political priorities before the needs of
those on the ground.”).
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Unlike aid programs, remittances provide a way to assist the country while acknowledging the agency of individual Haitians sending and
receiving remittances to choose how they wish to invest in their nation. 229 This does not mean that remittances will automatically solve economic or political issues in Haiti or that they come without their own
challenges. 230 However, facilitating remittances is a step away from imperialism and unfettered interference in Haitian affairs and a step closer to
true Haitian independence.
VI. Moving Towards Healing
Although immigrants as a whole have struggled throughout U.S.
history, the continued inferior treatment of immigrants of color—and
particularly Haitians—is evidence of institutionalized racism within the
immigration system as a whole. 231 Institutionalized racism is defined as
“[r]acial discrimination that has become established as normal behavior
within a society or organization.” 232 U.S. immigration policy has excluded Haitians for years and discriminatory actions such as the cancellation of
TPS for Haitians, which disproportionately impacts Black immigrants,
must be confronted and prevented—not simply through legal challenges
that highlight current injustices but through concrete, creative policies to
address past harm.
Despite their adverse history, Haiti and the United States are neighbors, separated by only 100 miles of blue Caribbean Sea, and share a distinct, centuries-old revolutionary origin story. That common bond
should motivate policies that recognize the truth of their relationship—
and the extent of the harms done—but also the possibility of what could
be. An honest commitment to exploring and acknowledging the pain of
229. Renata Sago, Haitians with TPS Help Fuel Haiti’s Economy, One Wire Transfer at a
Time, MARKETPLACE, Apr. 17, 2018, https://www.marketplace.org/2018/04/17
/economy/haitians-with-tps-help-fuel-haitis-economy [https://perma.cc/9ACE-B9N5]
(discussing role that Haitians abroad play in supporting Haiti).
230. Haiti - Economy: Impacts of Remittances from Diaspora on the National Economy,
HAITILIBRE (Apr. 4, 2017, 11:36 AM), http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-20563haiti-economy-impacts-of-remittances-from-diaspora-on-the-national-economy.html
[https://perma.cc/3LH7-5LXM] (discussing brain drain and use of remittances to import
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U.S. immigration policy could lead not only to treating current Haitian
asylum seekers and TPS holders with dignity and respect but to imagining a mutually beneficial relationship that benefits both countries as well
as the families and individuals caught in between Port-au-Prince and the
United States. Such a model of acknowledgement, remittances, and reparations would not only serve the U.S.-Haitian relationship, but also those
fleeing persecution and oppression around the world, especially those
from the Global South, seeking to realize their rights under international
law. As the famous Kréyol proverb goes, “dèyè mòn gen mòn,” or “beyond
mountains, there are mountains.” 233 Perhaps the first step towards healing
is simply to imagine what a just future could look like, somewhere just
beyond those peaks.
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